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The Strong Precautionary Principle, an approach to risk regula-
tion that shifts the burden of proof on safety, can provide a valuable
framework for preventing harm to human health and the environ-
ment. Cass Sunstein and other scholars, however, have consistently
criticized the Principle, rejecting it as paralyzing, inflexible, and ex-
treme.
In this reassessment of the Strong Precautionary Principle, I
highlight the significant benefits of the Principle for risk decision
making, with the aim of rescuing the Principle from its dismissive crit-
ics. The Principle sends a clear message that firms must research the
health and environmental risks of their products, before harm occurs.
It does not call for the elimination of all risk, nor does it ignore trade-
offs, as Sunstein has alleged. Rather, through burden shifting, the
Principle legitimately requires risk creators to research and justify the
risks they impose on society. By exploring where the Principle al-
ready operates successfully in U.S. law-examples often overlooked
by the critics-I highlight the Principle's flexibility and utility in regu-
latory law.
This Article uses chemical regulation as a case study in how the
Principle can guide Congress in an ongoing controversy. Congress is
considering a major overhaul of the flawed Toxic Substances Control
Act of 1976 (TSCA), and this change could be one of the most signif-
icant developments in environmental law in a generation. This Ar-
ticle advocates implementing the Strong Precautionary Principle in a
replacement statute for TSCA. Under my proposed licensing system,
chemical manufacturers would carry the burden to demonstrate that
their products do not pose significant risks to human health or the en-
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vironment. The TSCA example shows that the Strong Precautionary
Principle is not a vague abstraction, as critics have alleged, but can in-
stead provide practical guidance for strengthening a troubled, and
underprotective, chemical regulatory regime.
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INTRODUCTION
The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),' designed to
protect Americans from the risks of chemicals introduced into com-
merce, is now widely viewed by scholars and governmental experts as
flawed and underprotective.2  The U.S. chemical industry produces or
1. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2006).
2. For scholarly criticisms of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), see John S. Applegate,
Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 721 (2008); Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical
Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1817 (2009); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J.
1619 (2004). For governmental criticisms of TSCA, see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
09-428T, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Toxic
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imports more than seventy-three billion pounds of chemicals per day,3
yet TSCA does not require any form of routine chemical risk assessment.
As a result, we lack basic toxicity data for the vast majority of chemicals
used in cookware, toys, beauty products, food packaging, and other
items. The potential population-wide harm is sobering. Carcinogenic
chemicals once thought to be safely contained in consumer products are
now present in the bloodstream and tissues of virtually all Americans.4
Many interest groups are calling for an overhaul of TSCA. In 2010,
landmark TSCA reform bills were introduced in both houses of Con-
gress,' and principles to guide the reform effort have been announced by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),6 various U.S. states,' envi-
ronmental groups,' and the largest chemical industry trade association,
the American Chemistry Council. 9 Even if Congress does not act on
TSCA reform this term, states may step in to enact their own toxics regu-
latory regimes, as some states have done already. 0
The current interest in new approaches to chemical regulation pro-
vides an important opportunity to question prevailing U.S. frameworks
for risk regulation. What regulatory authority should legislators confer
on agencies to protect public health from toxic chemicals and other
risks? Who should bear the burden of proof on whether products or ac-
tivities that may pose serious risks should be allowed in commerce? And
should inevitable scientific uncertainty about the exact nature of a risk
cut in favor of regulation, or against it?
SUBSTANCES CONTROL AcT (2009) [hereinafter GAO, ENHANCING TSCA]; U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE
EPA's ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM (2005)
[hereinafter GAO, OPTIONS EXIST].
3. See OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006
INVENTORY UPDATE REPORTING: DATA SUMMARY 15 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/iur/pubs/
2006_data summary.pdf (reporting approximately twenty-seven trillion pounds of chemicals produced
or imported in the United States in 2005). This figure is likely an underestimate of total U.S. chemical
production, because low-volume chemical production, below 25,000 pounds per year at one site, did
not need to be reported to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 1.
4. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN
EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdfIFourth
ReportExecutiveSummary.pdf; Tracey J. Woodruff et al., Environmental Chemicals in Pregnant
Women in the US: NHANES 2003-2004, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 878, 879 tbl.1 (2011); see also
Richard A. Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10020, 10023 (2009).
5. Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong. (2010); Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010,
H.R. 5820, 111th Cong. (2010).
6. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM OF CHEMICALS
MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION (2010), http://www.epa.gov/opptlexistingchemicals/pubs/principles.pdf.
7. See States' Principles on Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.saferstates.comlattachments/StatePrinciples.pdf.
8. See SAFER CHEMICALS, HEALTHY FAMILIES, A PLATFORM FOR REFORM OF THE TOXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/SCHFCampaign-
Platform.pdf.
9. See AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 10 PRINCIPLES FOR MODERNIZING TSCA (2009), http://www.
americanchemistry.com/Policy/Chemical-Safety/TSCA/10-Principles-for-Modernizing-TSCA.pdf.
10. See Linda Breggin, A Critical Juncture in Fed-State Roles, ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 10
(discussing recent toxics regulatory initiatives in California, Massachusetts, and Washington).
1287
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
In this Article, which builds on my prior study of TSCA reform," I
use the chemical regulation debate as a lens for a broader reassessment
of a controversial approach to risk management, called the Strong Pre-
cautionary Principle. The Strong Precautionary Principle shifts the bur-
den of proof on the safety of a product or activity from government regu-
lators to private firms. I define it as the view that: (1) regulation should
presumptively be applied when an activity or product poses serious
threats to human health or the environment, even if scientific uncertainty
precludes a full understanding of the nature or extent of the threats; and
(2) the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of regulation lies
with the proponent of the risk-creating activity or product. 12
The Strong Precautionary Principle can be contrasted with the dom-
inant regulatory framework in the United States, in which government
agencies usually bear the burden of proof to show unacceptable risk
prior to restricting a product or activity. TSCA's requirement that the
EPA prove "unreasonable risk" to restrict a chemical is emblematic of
that regulatory approach, and that choice to put the burden of proof on
the EPA has crippled chemical regulation in the United States." Ac-
cording to Dr. Lynn Goldman, who oversaw TSCA implementation dur-
ing the Clinton Administration, TSCA will "never be effective" unless it
is amended to shift the burden of proof on chemical safety to chemical
manufacturers.14
A preventive regulatory framework grounded in a shift in the bur-
den of proof is attractive for a number of reasons, yet prior literature on
the Strong Precautionary Principle has been almost uniformly critical.
Cass Sunstein, John Graham, Jonathan Wiener, and other critics of the
Principle have little interest in its further application in TSCA, or else-
where. Instead, they want to bury it. Sunstein has derided Strong
Precaution as "senseless,"" "paralyzing," 6 and "worse than unhelp-
11. See Sachs, supra note 2.
12. A variety of definitions for the Strong Precautionary Principle may be found in the literature.
Two common elements of the Principle are an anticipatory approach to managing risks and a shift in
the burden of proof on whether a risky activity should be allowed to proceed. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); A.W. Harris, Derogating the Pre-
cautionary Principle, 19 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 63 (2008); Justin Wade, Sunstein's Blunder; Or, the Perils
of Reconstructing Precaution, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 473,485 (2008).
13. The term "unreasonable risk" occurs more than thirty-five times in the text of TSCA, and in
every case the EPA bears the burden to prove "unreasonable risk" for a chemical. JOHN S.
APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 276 (2d ed.
2011). Most importantly, the EPA bears the burden of proving "unreasonable risk" in the crucial pro-
visions of TSCA Section 6, governing restrictions on hazardous chemicals. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
For a discussion of the problems with the vague "unreasonable risk" standard and a governmental
burden of proof in chemical regulation, see John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: In-
formation, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991).
14. Toxic Substances Control Act and the Chemicals Management Program at EPA: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 75 (2006) (statement of Lynn R. Goldman,
Professor, Environmental Health Services, Johns Hopkins University).
15. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,1008 (2003).
16. Id. at 1004.
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fu1." 1 He and other detractors have charged that the Principle is exces-
sively risk averse, provides no guidance on which risks to address, and
ignores so-called "risk-risk" tradeoffs in which a precautionary response
to one "target" risk may lead to substitute risks that are even worse."
The Principle should be rejected, wrote Sunstein, "not because it leads in
bad directions, but because it leads in no direction at all. The principle is
literally paralyzing -forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and every-
thing in between." 19
This sharply critical scholarship is not a mere academic sideshow to
the Beltway battle over chemical regulation.20 If influential scholars and
key policy makers maintain that the Strong Precautionary Principle is il-
legitimate, then it is unlikely that TSCA will be reformed in a meaningful
way. Congress may miss a once-in-a-generation opportunity to repair
the moribund chemical regulatory system.
The stakes are high, yet few scholars have offered any sustained de-
fense of Strong Precaution. Most scholars of the role of precaution in
risk regulation have instead kept to the safer terrain of defending so-
called "weak" versions of the Precautionary Principle, which do not in-
volve burden shifting.21 While literature advocating "weak" precaution is
voluminous, 22 the scholarly terrain on the Strong Precautionary Principle
17. Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 5, 2004, at 27, 30. See also
AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY ISSUES, 429-30 (1995) (stating profound objections to the Precautionary Principle's reversal of
causality, in which individuals and businesses must prove that they will do no harm).
18. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle
and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 195 (2000) ("The problem is
that by focusing on one set of risks-those posed by the introduction of new technologies with some-
what uncertain effects-the precautionary principle turns a blind eye to the harms that occur, or are
made worse, due to the lack of technological development."); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1020 ("The
most serious problem with the strong version of the precautionary principle is that it offers no guid-
ance-not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including inaction."); Jonathan
Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 226 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener
eds., 1995) ("Each intervention to protect against a target risk can simultaneously generate counter-
vailing risks; these risk tradeoffs at least reduce the gross benefits of the intervention and in some cas-
es mean that the intervention will do more harm than good.").
19. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1003.
20. Sunstein heads the influential Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the
Executive Office of the President. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 16, 2010, at 38 (describing Sunstein's role at OIRA and his involvement in
Obama Administration debates over cost-benefit analysis, valuation of human life, and climate
change).
21. I define terms, including the differences between "weak" and "strong" versions of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, infra, Part I. Clarity of definitions is vital. Confusing and inconsistent definitions
of "precaution" and "precautionary principle" have clouded the scholarship in this area for decades.
22. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Embracing a Precautionary Approach to Climate Change, in
ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 171 (David M. Driesen ed., 2010) [herein-
after Applegate, Climate Change]; John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y. REV. 13 (2002) [hereinafter Applegate, The Taming]; Douglas A.
Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1
(2006); Elizabeth Fisher, Opening Pandora's Box: Contextualising the Precautionary Principle in the
European Union, in UNCERTAIN RISKS REGULATED 21 (Michelle Everson & Ellen Vos eds., 2009);
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has been ceded to its opponents.' Under their avalanche of criticism,
some breathing space is urgently needed to reconsider the merits and
practical applications of Strong Precaution. Indeed, resuscitating TSCA
as an effective chemical regulatory regime depends, in no small part, on
rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its critics.
This Article undertakes this much-needed reassessment of the
Strong Precautionary Principle. It proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I
provide a brief introduction to the concept of precaution in risk regula-
tion, distinguishing the Strong Precautionary Principle from its weaker
cousins. Then, directly considering the merits of Strong Precaution, I jus-
tify it instrumentally, as an incentive to develop information on health
and environmental risks, and deontologically, as a confirmation of the
moral obligations of those who seek to market potentially hazardous
products.
Part II counters the critics' objections to the Strong Precautionary
Principle. Cass Sunstein and other critics contend that Strong Precaution
represents a new and untested alternative to dominant risk-management
paradigms such as cost-benefit analysis.2 4 I show, on the other hand, that
Strong Precaution is already deeply rooted in U.S. law. It forms the basis
for numerous licensing, permitting, and preapproval programs that are
cornerstones of public health and environmental protection in the Unit-
ed States. The Food and Drug Administration's review process for new
drugs is just one of myriad examples.25
I also show in Part II that the Principle is not inflexible, extreme, or
cost insensitive, as the Principle's detractors would have us believe.
Sunstein's claim that Strong Precaution inevitably leads to "paralysis" is
a hyperbolic mischaracterization. Applied properly, the Strong Precau-
tionary Principle helps to uncover regulatory alternatives and permits
Gregory N. Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precautionary Principle:
Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037 (2006); Robert V. Percival, Who's
Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 21 (2005).
23. Advocates of the Strong Precautionary Principle write primarily outside of the legal acade-
my, perhaps reflecting the marginalization of the Principle in past legal scholarship. For work support-
ing the Principle, see collected essays in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTIVE
PUBLIC POLICY (Joel A. Tickner ed., 2003); collected essays in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE
ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A.
Tickner eds., 1999); Carl F. Cranor, Toward Understanding Aspects of the Precautionary Principle, 29
J. MED. & PHIL. 259 (2004); Sven Ove Hansson, Can We Reverse the Burden of Proof?, 90 Tox-
ICOLOGY LETTERS 223 (1997).
24. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, The Role of Pre-
caution in Risk Assessment and Management: An American's View, Address at The US, Europe, Pre-
caution and Risk Management: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Management of Risk in a
Complex World (Jan. 11-12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu speech.html ("[W]e
do not recognize any universal precautionary principle. We consider it to be a mythical concept, per-
haps like a unicorn."); Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS Rati-
fication Will Herald Europe's Precautionary Principle As U.S. Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 23, 27
(2009) ("[Tjhe Precautionary Principle ... entails a radical change in outlook.").
25. See discussion of the Principle's application in the FDA review process and other regulatory
regimes in Part II, infra.
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considerations of tradeoffs, while raising a wider set of questions than
traditional cost-benefit analysis. 26 The Principle is not antithetical to a
weighing of the costs and benefits of regulatory action. Indeed, critics
overlook that a cost-benefit test could be applied within a Strong Precau-
tionary framework, by requiring that the proponent of a risky activity
prove that the benefits of the activity outweigh the costs (shifting that
analytical burden off the government).
While Part II discusses some potential linkages between cost-benefit
analysis and Strong Precaution, I conclude, ultimately, that utilitarian
welfare maximization should not be the sole criterion for risk decision
making. The Strong Precautionary Principle is most attractive in con-
texts where traditional cost-benefit analysis is ill-suited. These contexts
involve pervasive uncertainty about the gravity of harm that might result
from an activity or the frequency of its occurrence, or compelling equity
or distributional concerns. Legislators may opt for a Strong Precaution-
ary framework for a variety of legitimate reasons, including protection of
crucial ecosystem functions, protection of future generations, or provid-
ing government review over the location or size of activities that may
harm the public. Moreover, the Principle's encouragement of ex ante,
premarket review of risks does clearly distinguish the Principle from
dominant risk management frameworks.
I concede in Part II that the Strong Precautionary Principle should
not be applied dogmatically as a universal framework for managing every
risk our society faces. More decentralized approaches, including tort lia-
bility and contractual informed consent, are often suitable for addressing
discrete risks that affect relatively few parties. Critics intent on blasting
Strong Precaution are ignoring, however, the Principle's "contextual ra-
tionality." 27 That is, they are ignoring the arenas of risk management,
such as chemical regulation, where the Principle's default presumptions,
burden shifting, and ex ante review of risks are eminently sensible.
In Part III, I take up the question of TSCA reform directly, showing
how the Strong Precautionary Principle could be incorporated in con-
crete statutory provisions while avoiding the parade of horribles alleged
by the critics. I advocate priority setting through certain "precautionary
triggers" that would compel more extensive review of the most hazard-
ous classes of chemicals. I also advocate shifting the burden of proof for
these chemicals and allowing limited avenues for continued marketing of
such chemicals (which I call "regulatory offramps") if the manufacturer
can demonstrate that the chemical can be used safely. Shifting the bur-
26. See Joel A. Tickner, A Map Toward Precautionary Decision Making, in PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 23, at 162, 163 (noting that the Precautionary Principle
asks a different set of questions from traditional risk assessment: "'How much contamination can be
avoided while still maintaining necessary values?'; 'What are the alternatives to this activity that
achieve a desired goal ... ?; and 'Do we need this activity in the first place?"').
27. David Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 67,
68 (2009).
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den of proof is, to be sure, just one element of dozens of needed changes
in TSCA. It is also the game changer. It will dramatically alter incen-
tives, loosen informational bottlenecks, and end our blithe acceptance of
"flying blind" in chemical risk management.
I. STRONG PRECAUTION AND RISK REGULATION
Precaution in risk regulation is controversial, in part, because of a
lack of consensus on what precaution means. A vast number of verbal
formulations have been developed to describe the concept of precaution,
from the simplistic "better safe than sorry" to complicated, multipart def-
initions. Collectively, these formulations are often called the Precau-
tionary Principle, but more accurately they should be called Precaution-
ary Principles, because they vary widely and are not synonymous with
each other. In this Part, I distinguish "weak" versions of the Precaution-
ary Principle from "strong" versions, clearing some definitional disarray.
I then directly address the merits of the Strong Precautionary Principle
as a framework for addressing health and environmental risks.
A. Defining the Terms
1. The Weak Precautionary Principle
"Weak" versions of the Precautionary Principle stand for the prop-
osition that regulators should be empowered to address risk in-contexts
of scientific uncertainty-that is, even before regulators fully understand
the nature or extent of risk. One widely cited "weak" version of the Pre-
cautionary Principle is contained in the Rio Declaration, adopted by con-
sensus by 172 countries (including the United States) at the Earth Sum-
mit in 1992.29 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.3 0
28. See, e.g., James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in In-
ternational Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 432-36 (1995) (identifying fourteen "articula-
tions of the Precautionary Principle in the major environmental instruments"); Per Sandin, Dimen-
sions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889 (1999) (cataloging
nineteen different versions of the Precautionary Principle); Joel A. Tickner et al., A Compass for
Health: Rethinking Precaution and Its Role in Science and Public Health, 32 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
489, 489 (2003) (describing the five-part definition of precaution in the 2001 Lowell Statement on
Science and the Precautionary Principle).
29. United Nations, UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), http://www.un.
org/geninfolbp/enviro.html (last visited June 2, 2011).
30. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/5/Rev.1
(Jun. 13, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992).
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This "weak" Precautionary Principle is eminently sensible, with po-
tential applications from water pollution control to natural resource
management, public health planning, and global climate change. It re-
flects that risk assessment is an uncertain science and that serious harm
might occur if we postpone regulatory action until all risks from an activi-
ty are fully understood. As a 2001 European Environment Agency
study, Late Lessons from Early Warnings, documented, there have been
numerous cases of governments' inability or refusal to regulate until long
after risks were widely known, such as asbestos, DES, tobacco, and mad
cow disease."
"Weak" versions of the Precautionary Principle, similar to the Rio
Declaration, have been adopted in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, other multilateral treaties, and decisions of interna-
tional tribunals.3 2 Most of the U.S. environmental and public health stat-
utes passed in the 1970s can be said to incorporate, implicitly, weak pre-
cautionary concepts.33  Statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act have preventive goals, and they
allow regulators to act on indications of potential harm from an activity
without first obtaining "full" scientific certainty that harm will in fact oc-
cur.34
Cass Sunstein, who has been the most vociferous critic of Strong
Precaution, notably favors embracing the Weak Precautionary Principle
in risk regulation. According to Sunstein, that principle suggests "quite
sensibly, that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground
for refusing to regulate." 35  Because the Weak Precautionary Principle
31. See EUR. ENV'T AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 1896-2000 (2001).
32. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 191,
Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 132 [hereinafter TFEU]; United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822
(1992); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3), May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992); Bamako Convention on the Ban of the
Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes Within Africa, art. 4, 1 3(f)-(h), Jan. 29, 1991,30 I.L.M. 773, 781-82 (1991).
33. As John Applegate has noted, while there is no U.S. statute that explicitly references the
Precautionary Principle, the Principle is reflected operationally in six kinds of provisions commonly
found in U.S. environmental statutes: "planning and alternatives analysis, special regulatory treatment
of certain categories of harm, the transition from tort to risk-based regulation, the adoption of margins
of safety in standard setting, the policy of erring on the side of safety in risk management, and the
shifting of the burden of proof" in some contexts. See John S. Applegate, The Precautionary Prefer-
ence: An American Perspective on the Precautionary Principle, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 413, 420 (2000).
34. See Daniel Bodansky, The Precautionary Principle in U.S. Environmental Law, in
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 203 (Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron eds.,
1994). Despite clearly precautionary language in many U.S. environmental and health statutes, many
scholars contend that the precautionary thrust of the statutes have been eroded through changes to the
U.S. regulatory system since the 1970s, including comprehensive cost-benefit analysis requirements
and more skeptical judicial review. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 33, at 430-31.
35. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 18; see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World,
in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509,1509 (Dennis J. Paus-
tenbach ed., 2002) (explaining that weak versions of the Principle are unobjectionable).
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does not prescribe any particular regulatory measures, some commenta-
tors have argued that it is essentially vacuous-a "feeble addition[] to the
regulatory landscape."36 Sunstein agrees. He concludes that the Weak
Precautionary Principle, while valid, is a mere "truism," so "banal" as to
be hardly worth further scholarly exploration. 7
Although Sunstein himself accepts the Weak Precautionary Prin-
ciple, others have attacked the Principle in three decades of acrimonious
debates, inside and outside the academy. Scholars have squared off over
how the Weak Precautionary Principle should be implemented; whether
it is consistent with quantitative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis,
or represents an alternate paradigm; and whether it actually animates
U.S. law or has instead been eroded through unreasonably stringent
"hard look" review and judicial demands for comprehensive administra-
tive records.38 In Washington, there is a widespread perception that
weak versions of the Precautionary Principle give extra "weight" to envi-
ronmental factors in risk decision making and would lead to abandon-
ment of "sound science" in favor of regulation based on speculation and
supposition of various threats to the environment. Public statements to
this effect are voluminous.39 These debates over the meaning of precau-
tion are, in essence, a proxy battle for much larger debates over how
stringent government regulation should be, what kinds of margins of
safety should be built into it, and when it should be deployed.
Many of these same debates carry over to the Strong Precautionary
Principle as well. Yet while weak versions of the Precautionary Principle
have dozens of advocates in the legal academy, few legal scholars have
elaborated a defense of Strong Precaution. This perhaps reflects mud-
dled definitions, as many scholars have advocated embracing the Pre-
cautionary Principle without defining which version of the Principle they
36. Edward Soule, Assessing the Precautionary Principle, 14 PUB. AFF. Q. 309,315 (2000).
37. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 24.
38. See Percival, supra note 22, at 36-37 (arguing that "despite the regulatory statutes' commit-
ment to preventative regulation," environmental law remains largely reactive, and regulation is rarely
imposed until damage to public health has occurred).
39. See 150 CONG. REc. 23,369 (2004) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) ("[Global warming] alarmists
often trot out a concept known as the precautionary principle-which is that it is better to be safe than
sorry. But .... [t]he science of global warming is uncertain, the costs of capping our economy with
carbon restriction are high, and even if the doomsayers were correct, it would do little to nothing to
reduce the temperature increases."); GARY E. MARCHANT & KENNETH L. MOSSMAN, ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COURTS 1 (2004)
("Perhaps the most common criticism of the precautionary principle ... is that it is inherently ambi-
guous and arbitrary."); Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One European
"Fashion" Export the United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 491, 506-07
(2008) (stating that the Precautionary Principle asks legislators "to evaluate public risks based on po-
litical, ethical, and/or social science concerns, rather than upon common-sense or hard, empirical,
sound science"); Soule, supra note 36, at 313; PARTNERSHIP FOR SOUND SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE OVERVIEW 1, (n.d), http://cicc.org/jru/031306/PPOverview.pdf
("[T]he Precautionary Principle diverts the attention of regulators and resources from real issues to
speculative concerns.... Implementing the Precautionary Principle can cause more harm than
good. . ." (emphasis omitted)).
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mean.4 0 The lack of attention to Strong Precaution might also reflect that
weaker versions of the Principle appear more "tame" or acceptable to
policy makers.41
No doubt the Strong Precautionary Principle is a lightning rod. As I
shall argue, however, it provides an important framework for protecting
Americans from toxic chemicals and other hazards, and it deserves a sus-
tained analysis of its merits.
2. The Strong Precautionary Principle
Both weak and strong versions of the Precautionary Principle em-
phasize anticipation of harm and taking preventive measures in the face
of uncertainty, but there are some important differences between the two
approaches. Whereas weak versions of the Precautionary Principle per-
mit the government to regulate risks under conditions of scientific uncer-
tainty, the Strong Precautionary Principle suggests that some precaution-
ary regulation should be a default response to serious risks under condi-
tions of scientific uncertainty. Such regulation could range from a blan-
ket prohibition on a proposed technology or a dangerous activity to less
aggressive defaults, such as use restrictions or warning requirements.42
Furthermore, whereas weak versions are primarily concerned with the
timing of governmental decision making, the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple explicitly places the burden on the private proponent of the risk-
creating activity to overcome the default by proving that risks are accept-
able or reasonable. 43
As noted in the Introduction, I define the Strong Precautionary
Principle as the view that: (1) regulation should presumptively be applied
when an activity or product poses serious threats to human health or the
environment, even if scientific uncertainty precludes a full understanding
of the nature or extent of the threats; and (2) the burden of overcoming
the presumption in favor of regulation lies with the proponent of the
risk-creating activity or product.
40. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is typical in this regard, as it declares
that EU environmental policy "shall be based on the precautionary principle," without defining the
Principle in the treaty. See TFEU art. 191. Partly to fill that gap, the European Commission has is-
sued its own (caveated) interpretation of the meaning of the Precautionary Principle. See COMM'N OF
THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2000).
41. See Applegate, The Taming, supra note 22, at 23-24 (documenting progressively softer and
less aggressive interpretations of the Precautionary Principle in risk regulation since the early 1990s).
42. The precautionary measures that can be applied under the Principle will necessarily vary,
depending on the magnitude of the expected risk and the strength of the scientific evidence. See infra
Part II.
43. By emphasizing that precautionary measures "should be taken" in response to threats to
human health or the environment, the Strong Precautionary Principle represents an affirmative call to
action, whereas the Weak Precautionary Principle is phrased in the negative (scientific uncertainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective regulatory measures) and, therefore, can
be seen as less demanding or less action-forcing.
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My definition roughly parallels the Wingspread Statement, a docu-
ment on precaution adopted by a group of prominent physicians, schol-
ars, and environmentalists in 1998.4 The Wingspread Statement was
primarily directed at emerging toxic risks, such as endocrine-disrupting
chemicals. Its language is broad, however, and it is often described in the
literature as emblematic of the Strong Precautionary Principle:45
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the en-
vironment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.
In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public,
should bear the burden of proof.46
I do not adopt the Wingspread Statement as my own definition because
it does not include the proviso that "threats" must be "serious." For the
Principle to be workable, there must be some serious risk threshold for
invoking precautionary measures and a shift in the burden of proof. Pre-
cautionary measures (such as bans, restrictions, or labeling and/or warn-
ing requirements) can be expensive and complex to implement, and they
should not be invoked for trivial dangers, or for activities where there is
no credible evidence of a risk.47
With that caveat in mind, the Strong Precautionary Principle, as I
have defined it, clearly places a default "hold" on certain activities that
may pose serious risks, until the proponent can prove that the activity
can be conducted safely, or at least with acceptable risk. In this sense,
the Principle establishes a "stop and think" mechanism under which the
risk creator bears the burden both to quantify the risk and to disclose rel-
evant risk data to regulators (such as accident probabilities, toxicity data,
health studies, dispersal projections for release of toxic materials, etc.).
Looking at my definition of Strong Precaution, it is clear that some
key issues, such as the degree of threat that will trigger burden shifting,
the precise precautionary measures that should be taken, and how much
information on risk the proponent must supply, are not specified in the
Principle itself. The Principle's generality leads Cass Sunstein, Gary
Marchant, and other critics to conclude that the Principle provides no
guidance whatsoever. 48
44. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 19.
45. See, e.g., EDWARD SOULE, MORALITY & MARKETS: THE ETHICS OF GOVERNMENT REG-
ULATION 147 (2003).
46. PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 23 app. A, at 353-54 (quot-
ing the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle). See also id. intro., at 7-9 (discussing
the history of the Wingspread Conference).
47. There are many other formulations of the Strong Precautionary Principle in the literature,
including some that suggest that any risk-producing activity must be halted until it is proven safe.
These highly aggressive, zero-risk standards should be rejected, as I explain in Part II. These outliers
need not deflect our attention from exploring versions of Strong Precaution that have some political
viability. Defending the Strong Precautionary Principle does not mean aligning oneself with the most
extreme, risk-intolerant formulations of it.
48. See, e.g., MARCHANT & MOSSMAN, supra note 39, at 1; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1003.
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Like any principle, however, Strong Precaution outlines a frame-
work or stance toward decision making, not a meticulously detailed pre-
scription for action. The details of regulatory design and the timing of
response are determined through legislation, not the Principle itself.
They will necessarily vary from one regulatory context to another.49 Leg-
islation grounded in the Strong Precautionary Principle might specify, for
example, that to commence with an activity or to introduce a product,
the proponent must prove "no substantial risk" to human health. Or, the
proponent might be required to prove that the benefits outweigh the
risks, or that the activity will be conducted in accordance with predeter-
mined safety standards. No serious analyst would contend that a one- or
two-sentence principle is the total guidance that regulators need to man-
age complex health and environmental risks. 0
Generality does not equate with vacuity, however. Strong Precau-
tion is not an empty "truism." It creates a recognizable architecture es-
tablishing who carries the burden of proof on complex public health and
environmental controversies.
The Principle can be compared to other similarly broad principles of
U.S. government, such as due process or equal protection, whose mean-
ings have been developed through repeated application in particular cas-
es and controversies. Or, since I argue that the Principle need not be un-
iversally applied, the Principle can be compared to other, noncon-
stitutional principles that have provided loose guidance to successive
administrations, such as the containment doctrine during the Cold War.
The containment doctrine was broadly defined and was subject to mul-
tiple interpretations and bitter disagreements about its meaning.5' Its full
49. See Kysar, supra note 22, at 7 n.32 (2006) ("Important implementation issues then include:
(1) the degree of credibility or seriousness of threat required in order to trigger the precautionary ob-
ligation; (2) the precise form that regulatory response should take; (3) and the manner in which the
regulatory response should be revisited and revised over time.").
50. See Applegate, Climate Change, supra note 22, 171-72 (noting that the Rio Declaration re-
quired twenty-seven principles to outline a broad framework for sustainable development and that the
Precautionary Principle is but one component of this framework).
51. The founding documents of the containment strategy, such as National Security Council
Memorandum 68 (NSC 68), used broad and open-ended language to describe the kinds of U.S. re-
sponses that would be appropriate to counter Soviet power and expansionism. The meaning of con-
tainment, therefore, was left to a discursive process of interpretation and implementation that oc-
curred over decades among the White House, Congress, the Pentagon, and other national security
agencies. NSC 68 stated, in part:
For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us
while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish ....
Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, in-
cluding the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values... In the words of
the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the
mischief." .. . Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent
with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the
limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may
encounter.
NATL SEC. COUNCIL, A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, NSC 68 (Apr. 14, 1950), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 8887, 1 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 234,244 (1950).
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scope was determined only through implementation in particular deci-
sions and crises.S2 Despite its generality, however, the containment doc-
trine provided a framework for action and helped to unite disparate fac-
tions of Congress, defense, and foreign policy agencies against the Soviet
military threat.53 The Strong Precautionary Principle could serve a simi-
lar function by providing a framework for addressing serious environ-
mental and public health threats.
One defining feature of the Strong Precautionary Principle is that it
places a governmental entity in a role as a risk gatekeeper. Implicit in
the Principle is the idea that there must be a "decider" who will deter-
mine whether the proponent of the activity has met its burden of proof
on safety.5 4 The preventive thrust of Strong Precaution further implies
that this review of risks should occur before the activity commences or
the potentially risky product reaches the market. Critics contend that the
Principle is "anti-scientific"" or will devolve into regulation based on
speculation,56 but the Principle is fully consistent with scientific risk as-
sessment techniques. Indeed, scientifically sound risk assessment is cru-
cial to identify which risks are "serious" and worthy of regulatory atten-
tion. The Principle encourages conducting that risk assessment, where
possible, on an ex ante, premarket basis, rather than in a reactive posture
in response to harm that has already occurred.
This comparatively aggressive role for government to police private
sector activity, or to determine ex ante which products can and cannot be
marketed, has received intense criticism, especially from the right." If
the Weak Precautionary Principle implies a relatively libertarian view of
the world, in which regulators are empowered (but not required) to in-
tervene in the marketplace to address externalities-"threats of serious
or irreversible damage" to the environment 8 - then the Strong Precau-
tionary Principle implies a more vigorous role for government to deter-
52. See ROGER S. WHITCOMB, THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPECT: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 87-88
(1998).
53. See id. at 93-101.
54. Literature on the Strong Precautionary Principle has rarely addressed this core issue of who
should decide whether the burden of proof has been met. The Lowell Statement on Science and Pre-
cautionary Principle, for example, states that "responsibility" should be placed on "originators of po-
tentially dangerous activities to thoroughly study and minimize risks, and to evaluate and choose the
safest alternatives to meet a particular need, with independent review." Tickner et al., supra note 28, at
489 (emphasis added). The entity that should conduct that independent review is not specified, how-
ever. See also PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 23 intro., at 8 (stating
that the "proponent of an activity... should bear the burden of proof' but not identifying who will
judge whether the proponent has met that burden).
55. Sallie Baliunas, Warming Up to the Truth: The Real Story About Climate Change,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2002), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-real-
story-about-climate-change.
56. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; John D. Graham, The Perils of the Precautionary Principle: Les-
sons from the American and European Experience (Oct. 20, 2003), in HERITAGE LECTURES, Jan. 15,
2004, at 1-4.
57. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 18, at 174; Graham, supra note 56, at 1-4.
58. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 30, at 879.
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mine, ex ante, whether certain products or activities should be prohibited
in the marketplace, given their health and environmental risks. Below, I
respond to the criticism that Strong Precaution is overly bureaucratic or
stifling of economic freedom. But for present purposes, the key point is
simply to recognize the gatekeeping role of government under the Prin-
ciple. In practice, Strong Precaution is usually operationalized through a
governmental licensing, permitting, or preapproval system. In these con-
texts, the private proponent bears both the burden of production (re-
searching the nature and extent of risks and making such evidence avail-
able for governmental review) and the burden of persuasion
(demonstrating to the decision maker that specific statutory or regulatory
safety standards have been met).
B. The Salutary Signals of Strong Precaution
In a 1999 article, Ronald Bailey, a libertarian science writer, lam-
pooned the Strong Precautionary Principle, arguing that the Principle
warps the "proverbial wisdom" of "look before you leap." 9 The Prin-
ciple, he wrote facetiously, commands that citizens justify every leap in
order to receive their "leaping license" from a "Federal Leaping Com-
mission.""0 Bailey charged:
In effect, before you or anybody else can leap, you will not only
have to look beforehand in the prescribed manner, you will have to
prove that if you leap, you won't be hurt, nor will any other living
thing be hurt, now and for all time. And if you can't prove all of
that, the commission will refuse to grant you a leaping license.'
This parody is amusing, yet it completely ignores why Strong Pre-
caution is fully justifiable in some regulatory contexts, including chemical
regulation.
Strong Precaution sends salutary signals to risk creators: it compels
them to research the risks of their activities and sends an unmistakable
message that we will not wait until damage is done before requiring some
investigation and justification of the potential hazards. It ensures that
the public is informed about, and has a say in, the deployment of tech-
nologies that may have serious public health impacts.
While more decentralized legal mechanisms, such as the tort system
or contractual bargaining, may be appropriate to address identifiable
risks affecting a small number of parties, these approaches are usually in-
adequate to address diffuse harm affecting whole communities, or harms
with complex chains of causation.62 A Strong Precautionary framework,
59. Ronald Bailey, Precautionary Tale, REASON, Apr. 1999, at 37, 37.
60. Id. at 37.
61. Id. at 37-38.
62. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357
(1984) (analyzing shortcomings of tort liability for addressing certain types of harms, including diffuse
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in contrast, makes sense where a risk creator's "leap" might cause wide-
spread, diffuse harm to others (consider mercury pollution from a power
plant or a manufacturer's decision to use endocrine-disrupting chemicals
in the plastics for toys). The framework is also well suited for preventing
ecosystem harm where responding to damage after the fact has serious
drawbacks (consider the lax governmental oversight that contributed to
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill).63
Serious externalities turn private choice into public risks. If ex post
tort remedies or ex post regulatory interventions are likely to be inade-
quate in the event that damage does occur, then it becomes reasonable to
ask the "leaper" to justify why that activity should take place and to
place some limits upon it, before potential harm occurs., A likely pros-
pect of ex post legal failure, in other words, enhances the desirability of
ex ante regulatory gatekeeping.
In the context of toxic chemicals, "leaping" (introducing untested
chemicals into commerce) may lead to harm that is nonconsensual or
unknown to the injured party, to diffuse low-level harms, or to serious
harm that may occur decades after the "leap" occurs. 65 Given that dif-
fuse harm from chemicals is poorly addressed through tort suits or post-
market regulatory interventions, requiring a chemical manufacturer to
undertake ex ante investigation and justification of risks, far from being
excessive or extreme, is sensible public policy.
Strong Precaution establishes this risk gatekeeping mechanism. It
offers both a procedural tool for incentivizing risk research and substan-
tive default rules for protecting public health.
Procedurally, the Principle acts as an information-forcing device. It
provides a profit motive for firms to undertake research on the health
and environmental risks of their own products and activities. 66 Bearing
the burden of proof, firms will have a keen interest in developing the risk
harms and harms where the tortfeasor may escape full internalization of the harm because it is judg-
ment proof).
63. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 77-85 (2011) (detailing
ethical lapses, mismanagement, and lax oversight in the Department of Interior and criticizing the cat-
egorical exemptions of site-specific Gulf of Mexico drilling plans from the review procedures of the
National Environmental Policy Act).
64. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 9 (2010) ("Proponents of the precautionary approach ... emphasize the
limits of human knowledge and the frequency of unpleasant surprises from technology and industrial
development; thus, they advocate an ex-ante governmental stance of precaution whenever a proposed
activity meets some threshold possibility of causing severe harm to human health or the environ-
ment.").
65. See Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting
Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1999) (detailing obstacles to private tort litigation over chem-
ical exposures).
66. The informational benefits of the Precautionary Principle have been widely noted in the lit-
erature. See Applegate, supra note 33; Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the Precautionary
Principle, and Burdens of Proof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
23, at 74,81-82.
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assessment data that will facilitate approval by government regulators
(consider the investment that drug manufacturers make in clinical trials
and in New Drug Applications to the Food and Drug Administration).
The Principle flips the perverse incentives that occur under a regulatory
regime with a governmental burden of proof, in which regulated firms
stand to gain by not developing, or by obfuscating, important risk as-
sessment data.
With some exceptions, a governmental burden of proof is the norm
in U.S. environmental and public health law."7 As Wendy Wagner has
observed, the governmental burden of proof under TSCA has encour-
aged chemical manufacturers to maintain "strategic ignorance" by not
developing toxicity data on their own products." TSCA does not estab-
lish routine risk assessment requirements for chemicals, but instead au-
thorizes EPA to order risk assessments on a case-by-case basis (each
EPA test rule is a major rulemaking process, requiring two to ten years
for the agency to finalize).69 As a result, thirty-five years after TSCA's
enactment, we have basic toxicity data for only a few thousand of the
84,000 chemicals that have been introduced into commerce in the United
States.70 The threat of tort liability does not cure this deficiency of regu-
latory law.71 In fact, the tort system likely reinforces strategic ignorance,
as it provides an incentive for chemical manufacturers to avoid any re-
search on product hazards that could trigger ex post liability.72
A regulatory regime that combines a high burden of proof on an
agency with a data-starved informational environment is likely to lead to
regulatory paralysis. This has been the story of TSCA since its enact-
ment.
The Strong Precautionary Principle, in contrast, recognizes that the
supply of risk assessment data on a given product or activity is not ex-
ogenous to the regulatory system. Incentives built into the regulatory
system, rather, help determine whether firms will undertake basic re-
search on the health and environmental effects of their products and ac-
67. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006) ("Except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.").
68. Wagner, supra note 2, at 1685.
69. GAO, OTIONs EXIST, supra note 2, at 19-26.
70. This "data drought" has many causes, including that: (1) TSCA provides no mandate for rou-
tine toxicity testing for most chemicals on the market, (2) the statute in practice requires EPA to as-
semble substantial information on the risks of a chemical just to issue an order to require testing, and
(3) industry has frequently litigated over the few testing orders that the EPA has issued. See Sachs,
supra note 2, at 1827-28 (outlining features of TSCA that limit data supply).
71. Dana, supra note 27, at 83.
72. See id. (explaining that "rational, profit-maximizing corporations and other actors will not
invest in testing and monitoring" under certain conditions, including "when particular products pose
theoretical risks but not empirically-established ones; when any adverse effects would likely occur only
in the relatively distant future; and when the link between the product and any distant adverse effects
could well escape notice, or at least be difficult to establish as a matter of 'but for' causation").
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tivities.7 1 As Jim Salzman and Doug Kysar observed, shifting the burden
of proof "works to counterbalance certain perceived structural asymme-
tries of the unregulated market" and "actively deploy[s] private actors in
service of the public's informational needs." 74
European Union (EU) chemical legislation, called Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),"
provides one prominent example of the information-forcing incentives of
the Strong Precautionary Principle. In REACH, the EU implemented
the concept of "No Data, No Market," under which manufacturers and
importers are obligated to submit a basic toxicity data set for any chemi-
cal produced or imported in the EU in a volume of ten tons or more.16
Unlike TSCA, REACH is a true market-access regulation. The submis-
sion of the data set is made a precondition of access to the E537 billion
European chemical market.77  By rewarding knowledge and making
chemical manufacturers responsible for data production, REACH is
helping to end the data drought that has plagued European chemical
regulation since the early 1980s.7 1 U.S. chemical firms doing business in
Europe are already subject to REACH, and as I explained in a previous
article, the implementation of REACH in Europe is likely to undermine
objections of U.S. chemical manufacturers that routine toxicity testing is
too expensive or cumbersome.79
While providing an important framework for gathering data, the
Strong Precautionary Principle should be viewed as more than an infor-
mational tool. In chemical regulation, a strategy of "filling" data gaps
with more research can only take us so far.? Uncertainty about key is-
73. Kysar, supra note 22, at 28 ("[P]roponents of the [Precautionary Principle] recognize that
uncertainty itself is a subject of power, influence, and control .... Thus, the content of scientific know-
ledge and the manner of its production are not treated exogenously by the [Precautionary Principle],
but instead are made a central focus of the regulatory program.").
74. Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protec-
tion, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1351-52 (2008).
75. Commission Regulation 1907/2006,2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EC) [hereinafter REACH].
76. Sachs, supra note 2, at 1834-35.
77. Id. at 1835. The preamble to REACH states that the regulation "is based on the principle
that it is for manufacturers, importers and downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on
the market or use such substances that do not adversely affect human health or the environment."
REACH, supra note 75, at 47.
78. Only seventy chemical risk assessments were required by government regulators in the prior
thirty years, out of a universe of more than 30,000 chemicals produced in quantities greater than one
ton. Sachs, supra note 2, at 1833-34.
79. See id. at 1862-67 (analyzing the extraterritorial impacts of REACH).
80. John Applegate's distinction between "filling strategies" and "bridging strategies" to over-
come data gaps in chemical regulation has been an important contribution to the debate over TSCA
reform. See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for Chemi-
cal Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365 (2008). Applegate argues that "filling strategies," involving
more research, often have diminishing returns due to the time and expense of chemical testing and
residual scientific uncertainty about the extent of risk even when testing is conducted. Id. at 1385-89.
"Bridging strategies," on the other hand, are designed to "bridge" the data gap by reducing the overall
regulatory demand for information. Id. at 1395-1406. Bridging strategies include technology stand-
ards, shifts in the burden of proof, and incentives for safer substitute chemicals. Id. See also David E.
Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation, 32 WASH U. J.L. &
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sues, such as low-dose effects of chemicals, may not be resolvable even
through extensive testing. The Strong Precautionary Principle also helps
to "bridge" data gaps by altering default decision rules for how the gov-
ernment should respond when scientific uncertainty prevents a complete
assessment of environmental or health risks.
The primary goal under Strong Precaution is to avoid Type II (false
negative) decision errors. A risk regulatory regime grounded in Strong
Precaution would aim to avoid the false conclusion that there is low risk
for products and activities that in fact pose grave risks. Through shifting
the burden of proof, if the proponent can develop only scant information
on the nature or extent of risk, Strong Precaution applies a default pro-
hibition (or at least restriction) on the activity or product. Strong Pre-
caution provides a window of opportunity for advance review of risks,
and in implementing the Principle in a particular statute, legislators are
making a decision to err on the side of caution when there are conflicting
studies or insufficient information to characterize risks accurately.81
In contrast, many U.S. regulatory regimes, including TSCA, place a
premium on avoidance of Type I (false positive) errors. They start with
the assumption that risks are zero, unless a government agency gathers
data and affirmatively proves the presence of substantial risk to trigger
regulation. Under TSCA, EPA must meet this burden-proving "unrea-
sonable risk" from a chemical under Section 6-under searching stan-
dards of judicial review, and the agency has succeeded in restricting only
five chemicals under that standard in the thirty-five year history of the
Act.82 This ostensible regulatory authority of the EPA has been crippled
in practice since 1991, when EPA's regulation banning most uses of as-
bestos was struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A.83 Since that case, EPA has not
imposed any restrictions on chemicals already on the market under Sec-
tion 6, and Corrosion Proof Fittings is widely viewed as the death knell
for EPA's practical ability to restrict dangerous substances under
TSCA.M
Regulatory regimes designed to avoid Type I errors, such as TSCA,
are not value neutral. They reflect an implicit assumption that the cur-
POL'Y 377, 381 (2010) ("[T]oxics regulation should avoid the deep epistemic gaps to the extent that it
can.").
81. See Hansson, supra note 23, at 227 (arguing that in implementing a burden shift in chemical
regulation, where there are "diverging but scientifically sound interpretations of toxicological data,
precedence should be given to the interpretations that support the most pessimistic predictions with
respect to human health").
82. GAO, OPTIONS ExIST, supra note 2, at 18.
83. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). One reason that the court rejected the asbestos ban was be-
cause EPA had not performed a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for intermediate measures short
of a complete ban under the complex procedures of the statute. Id. at 1230.
84. DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, ToxIc DECEPTION: How THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
MANIPULATES SCIENCE, BENDS THE LAW AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH 138 (1996); Robert V.
Percival, Responding to Environmental Risk: A Pluralistic Perspective, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513
(1997); Sachs, supra note 65, at 324.
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rent economic order and mix of products in the marketplace is to be par-
ticularly valued and should not be disturbed absent a very high threshold
showing by the government.85  The Strong Precautionary Principle, on
the other hand, requires justification from private actors for why prod-
ucts or activities that may cause serious harm to the public should be al-
lowed on the market. It thereby highlights the moral obligations of firms
that profit from activities that could cause widespread public harm. In-
deed, the Principle reminds both the regulator and the regulated party
that risk regulatory decisions carry "distinctive moral weight and respon-
sibility." 6
Each default decision rule has its potential drawbacks. Legislation
designed to avoid Type I errors raises the possibility of regulation that
comes "too late" or that is underprotective, responding to serious harm
only after it occurs. Statutes grounded in Strong Precaution raise the
possibility of regulation that is "too early" or that aggressively responds
to risks that may later turn out to be less severe than initially believed.
But some default decision rule must be chosen, and we should not dis-
miss the default presumptions of Strong Precaution out of hand. The
most pressing question, rather, is deciding which default decision rules
make sense in particular areas of law.
In chemical regulation, it has become clear that Congress erred on
the side of unsafety, or as Wendy Wagner put it, "unprecaution."8 As I
explain in Part III, implementing the Strong Precautionary Principle
would redress many of the historic flaws in TSCA. The question is, will
Congress adopt this framework for chemical risk management, given
how the critics have tarnished it?
II. RESCUING THE STRONG PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
FROM ITS CRITICS
The Strong Precautionary Principle has become a punching bag for
many scholars of risk regulation. Cass Sunstein and other prominent
scholars have unsparingly attacked it, and lacking many defenders, the
Principle's reputation has been battered.
In this Part, I respond to these critiques. My rebuttal here is quali-
fied. I fully concede that the Strong Precautionary Principle cannot be a
universally applicable approach to all health and environmental dangers
that society faces. But it can serve as the platform for protective risk de-
cision making in discrete areas of law, including chemical regulation. By
caricaturing the Principle as extreme and dismissing it out of hand as un-
85. Cranor, supra note 23, at 271.
86. Kysar, supra note 22, at 12.
87. Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM.
& ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 468 (2000) (arguing that TSCA reflects an "unprecautionary
principle").
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workable, the Principle's detractors have overlooked both its utility and
the myriad examples where it already operates successfully in U.S. law.
A. The Critics' Complaints
The critics share some common objections. They often maintain
that the Principle is extreme, inflexible, anti-science, anti-growth, or anti-
technology." Because Strong Precaution shifts the burden of proof on
safety, critics allege that its implementation would prevent promising
new technologies from getting off the ground, especially in emerging
fields with a high degree of uncertainty about risks.' Sunstein claims
that the Strong Precautionary Principle would "eliminate technologies
and strategies that make human lives easier, more convenient, healthier,
and longer."" John Graham names the internal combustion engine, elec-
tricity, plastics, and the Internet as examples of technologies that would
have been prohibited.91 Harvey Miller and Gregory Conko further
charge that "[i]f the precautionary principle had been applied decades
ago to innovations such as polio vaccines and antibiotics, ... that precau-
tion would have come at the expense of millions of lives lost to infectious
diseases. "92
The claim that Strong Precaution is antithetical to technological
progress is closely related to another view in the critical literature: Strong
Precaution requires that manufacturers prove "zero risk" or "absolute
safety" for an activity to proceed." These, of course, are impossible
standards to meet (and the Strong Precautionary Principle, as I and oth-
ers have defined it, does not impose them). Other critics suggest that the
Principle will be applied on the mere "conjecture"9 or "speculation"95 of
a threat to health or the environment, suppressing important technolo-
gies without any scientific basis. In addition, because of the strong gov-
ernment role and the shift in the burden of proof, critics have argued that
Strong Precaution is overly statist; its "guilty-until-proven-innocent" ap-
proach to addressing risk is allegedly contrary to U.S. values."
88. See, e.g., Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1 (Julian Morris ed., 2000); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 851 (1996); Graham, supra note 24.
89. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 24.
90. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 25.
91. Graham, supra note 56, at 3.
92. Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, The Science of Biotechnology Meets the Politics of Global
Regulation, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE (2000), http://www.nap.edu/issues/17.1/miller.htm.
93. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 39, at 601-03.
94. See Miller & Conko, supra note 92.
95. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle As a Basis for Decision Making, 2
ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 5 (2005) (claiming that the Precautionary Principle "attempt[s] to prevent even
speculative harm").
96. See Bailey, supra note 59, at 37; Kogan, supra note 39, at 601-03 (contrasting the Precaution-
ary Principle with the "founding principles of our society, chief among them economic and political
freedom and the rule of law"); Miller & Conko, supra note 92.
1305
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Cass Sunstein, the leading U.S. critic of the Strong Precautionary
Principle, claims that the Principle is, ultimately, paralyzing as an ap-
proach to risk decision making.' If the Strong Precautionary Principle
presumptively requires regulation of activities that present serious
threats to health, safety, or the environment, then, according to Sunstein,
the Principle will paralyze decision makers because threats may be
created both by regulatory inaction and by regulatory action.98
This "paralysis" critique begins from the proposition that regulation
itself has costs and potential risks. For instance, introduction of genetic-
ally modified crops may harm ecosystems, but harm may also occur
(from increased hunger or more widespread pesticide use) if genetically
modified crops are prohibited." With respect to drug approvals, Sun-
stein notes that stringent Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review
requirements for new drugs may block introduction of dangerous medi-
cations, but the delay involved in FDA review (so-called "drug lag")
means that life-saving drugs may not reach patients who need them."oo
Sunstein questions: "Is it 'precautionary' to require extensive premarket-
ing testing, or to do the opposite?"o' The Strong Precautionary Principle
allegedly provides no guidance. According to Sunstein, the Principle
"forbids all courses of action, including regulation. It bans the very steps
that it requires."102
Given the presence of these risk-risk tradeoffs, Sunstein maintains,
a principle that calls generally for caution in the face of risk, or that calls
for shifting the burden of proof in response to serious threats to human
health or the environment, is logically incoherent. Strong Precaution
only seems appealing as an approach to risk because we naturally focus
our attention on certain novel "target" risks (such as genetically modified
foods or a chemical recently in the news, such as Bisphenol-A) and ig-
nore both the opportunity costs of regulation and the risks presented by
the status quo. 03 The way out of these decision-making dilemmas, Sun-
97. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 14-15.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id. In another example, Sunstein notes that many chemical agents may be carcinogenic at
very low levels, while others may be beneficial at very low levels even if harmful at high levels (the so-
called "hormesis" effect). Id. at 30-31. Therefore, the "simultaneous possibility of benefits at low
levels and of harms at low levels makes the Precautionary Principle paralyzing." Id.
102. Id. at 26.
103. Sunstein argues that five different cognitive biases operate to make the Strong Precautionary
Principle appear functional: (1) individuals focus on salient risks that come to mind from media re-
ports or recent memory, and they ignore less visible risks; (2) probability neglect leads people to con-
centrate on worst-case outcomes, even if they are highly improbable; (3) loss aversion causes people to
avoid changes from the status quo, even if the status quo poses its own risks; (4) a widespread belief
that nature is benign makes human-created risks seem particularly suspect; and (5) system neglect pre-
vents people from appreciating opportunity costs and the substitute risks that may arise when a partic-
ular technology or product is restricted. See id. at 36-49; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1011 (arguing that
the Principle's "puzzling appeal" reflects its dependence on cognitive biases).
1306 [Vol. 2011
No. 4] RESCUING THE STRONG PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
stein maintains, is comprehensive cost-benefit analysis," or, as John
Graham and Jonathan Wiener advocate, "risk tradeoff analysis. "105
Through careful quantitative analysis, critics suggest, regulators will be
able to assess and compare the risks that would be created by different
decision-making paths.1" Once these risks are identified, regulators can
then choose the most cost-effective risk-reducing interventions.
B. Countering the Critics
To defend use of the Strong Precautionary Principle in regulatory
law, I make three principal claims. First, I demonstrate that Strong Pre-
caution already operates successfully in U.S. law, undermining critics' ar-
guments that the Principle is somehow inherently unworkable or paralyz-
ing. Second, I show that the critics' charge of extremism is overheated.
The Principle does not require prohibiting all risky activities, and in fact
it provides flexibility for policy makers to determine how much risk will
be tolerable or acceptable in a given area of law, as well as flexibility to
determine proportionate regulatory responses. Finally, I show that the
critique that Strong Precaution is "paralyzing" because of risk-risk trade-
offs is overstated, especially against the backdrop of its practical imple-
mentation in U.S. law. Properly implemented, the Principle allows regu-
lators to consider tradeoffs and alternatives. It commands neither ex-
treme regulation nor abdication of judgment.
1. Strong Precaution in Existing Law
Critics often paint Strong Precaution as a new kid on the block, a
yet-to-be-tried alternative to cost-benefit analysis, or an exotic import
from Europe that has not been embraced in the United States.t" These
attempts at delegitimization fail to recognize that the Strong Precau-
tionary Principle already operates successfully in U.S. law. From Capitol
Hill to state houses, legislators have frequently (and sensibly) turned to
ex ante gatekeeping mechanisms to protect public health and the envi-
ronment against serious risk.
The FDA's review process for new drugs is a prime example. Un-
der the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,10 all substances meeting
104. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 129 (cost-benefit analysis gives people "a more accurate sense of
the actual harms against which protection is sought" and provides "a clearer sense of the stakes").
105. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 18, at 19-22. Graham and Wiener describe risk tradeoff
analysis as a three-part process that identifies tradeoffs that might result from an intervention, weighs
the comparative importance of target risks and countervailing risks, and analyzes the possibility of
"risk-superior" moves that might result in overall risk reduction. Id.
106. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 6 ("We do not believe there is any principled way of making poli-
cy decisions without making the best possible effort to balance all the relevant costs of a policy against
the benefits.").
107. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 39, at 493.
108. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006). The
FFDCA was enacted in 1938 and was substantially amended in 1962 to require the affirmative approv-
1307
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the definition of a drug'" are presumptively banned from sale in the
United States, unless the manufacturer produces relevant data on risks,
side effects, and efficacy; conducts clinical trials; and receives affirmative
FDA approval for sale.n0 In this system, the FDA stands in the exact
gatekeeping role called for by the Strong Precautionary Principle. In-
deed, the FDA's new drug review system can be viewed as a particularly
potent form of Strong Precaution, because the precautionary measure
implemented as a response to serious threats to human health from un-
tested drugs is a complete prohibition. That prohibition, backed by crim-
inal penalties,"' remains in place (without any cost-benefit analysis) until
the drug manufacturer can overcome the default and carry its burden of
proof on safety and efficacy.112
Belying the argument that a gatekeeping role for government is in-
herently anti-science or anti-technology, the United States has main-
tained this FDA review process for decades while also developing the
most innovative and profitable pharmaceutical industry in the world. As
noted above, some critics point to antibiotics as the leading example of a
useful product that would have been squelched if the United States had
embraced Strong Precaution decades ago."3 But pharmaceutical manu-
facturers have developed life-saving antibiotics since the 1940s and will
continue to do so, within a regulatory system that reflects Strong Precau-
tion.114 Allocation of the burden of proof to drug manufacturers has nei-
ther extinguished the market for, nor the supply of, life-saving antibi-
otics.
The EPA's registration system for pesticides is another example of
a Strong Precautionary approach to risk regulation. Under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),"5 a pesticide
manufacturer carries both the burden of production (compiling data on
health and environmental effects of pesticides proposed for registration)
and the burden of persuasion, showing that the pesticide complies with
specific statutory standards, including that "it will perform its intended
al of the FDA before a new drug could be marketed. Prior to 1962, new drug applications were
deemed approved unless a contrary order was issued. See USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S.
655 (1962).
109. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (definition of "drug"); Id. § 321(p) (definition of "new drug").
110. See id. § 355(a) (prohibiting the sale of new drugs without FDA approval); Id. § 355(b)-(d)
(describing the application and approval process).
111. Id. § 333(b) ("[A]ny person who violates [the FFDCA] by ... knowingly selling, purchasing,
or trading a drug ... shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined not more than $250,000,
or both.").
112. See id. § 355.
113. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
114. It was the unregulated introduction of an antibiotic, causing widespread illness in the 1930s,
which led to public outcry in favor of a premarket government review system. The purported antibiot-
ic was called "Elixir Sulfanilamide," and more than one hundred people were poisoned by it in Ten-
nessee before the FFDCA was enacted. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Reg-
ulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1761-64 (1996) (describing the origins of the
FFDCA).
115. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (2006).
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function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.""'
EPA's role is to review the submitted risk data, determine whether the
applicant has met the statutory criteria, and if so, approve labeling lan-
guage and any use restrictions."' The regulatory default, in advance of
the pesticide manufacturer meeting its burden of proof, is to prohibit the
introduction of the new pesticide."'
The rationale for EPA preapproval for pesticides and FDA preap-
proval for new drugs is similar: to prevent serious harm by requiring risk
assessment, data disclosure, and agency review of risks before the prod-
uct is placed into widespread circulation. In arguing for a shift in the
burden of proof under TSCA, I am suggesting aligning chemical regula-
tion more closely with these two older models of risk regulation.
John Applegate, who has written extensively on the role of the Pre-
cautionary Principle in risk regulation, has argued that FIFRA is the only
example of a true burden-shifting statute in U.S. environmental law."'
But far more examples can be identified if we broaden the lens beyond
statutes that license particular products to statutes that regulate envi-
ronmentally hazardous activities. Strong Precaution is currently being
applied not just in a few federal regulatory programs, but pervasively, in
thousands of local, state, and federal permitting and licensing programs.
From special use permits in local zoning laws to air emissions permits,
water pollutant discharge permits, and nuclear power plant licenses, leg-
islatures routinely establish regulatory regimes that contain a prohibition
on engaging in an activity that may pose serious threats to human health
or the environment. Such programs prohibit, on an ex ante basis, a class
of activities suspected of posing potential risks, without any considera-
tion of the economic benefits from individual activities within the class.
The prohibition is overcome only when the proponent has applied for
permission, researched and disclosed relevant risk data, met statutory
standards, and received affirmative approval from a governmental entity.
The Clean Air Act, for example, prohibits operation of an entire
class of industrial facilities and electric generating plants ("major
sources"), until the facility obtains a permit from federal or state regula-
tory authorities.120 The operator of the source has the burden of demon-
strating, through its own computer modeling, that the emissions from the
116. Id. § 136a(c)(5) (2006).
117. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES, REGULATING PESTICIDES, http://www.
epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/index.htm ("EPA must first ensure that the pesticide... can be used
with a reasonable certainty of no harm to human healtA and without posing unreasonable risks to the
environment. To make such determinations, EPA requires more than 100 different scientific studies
and tests from applicants.").
118. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) ("Except as provided by this [Act], no person in any State may distri-
bute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not registered under this [Act].").
119. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 430 ("With the notable exception of FIFRA, the burden of
proving the existence and magnitude of an environmental risk is uniformly placed on the agency seek-
ing to impose restrictions.").
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2006).
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source will not cause violations of the health-based National Ambient
Air Quality Standards121 and other statutory requirements. In toxics reg-
ulation, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act prohibits opera-
tion of any hazardous waste transport, storage, or disposal facility with-
out a permit.122 Years of problems with responding to hazardous waste
spills after the fact prompted Congress, in 1976, to turn to this ex ante li-
censing mechanism to ensure that operators are qualified, have adequate
insurance, and undertake proper safety precautions.123
Strong Precaution's critics have rarely recognized such permitting
and licensing programs as examples of the Principle's longstanding influ-
ence in U.S. law.124 Instead, critics such as John Graham treat the Prin-
ciple as a novel, untested technique that would, if implemented, divert
"the energies of regulators and the regulated community" from "known
or plausible hazards to speculative and ill-founded ones."'25 But the na-
tion's historic reliance on the Principle to protect important public values
belies this assertion.
Critics are overlooking that the Principle can provide a workable
accommodation between the needs of industry and the need to ensure
harm prevention and adherence to ecological limits. Specifically, putting
government in a risk gatekeeping role serves several important purposes,
including:
* Ensuring that the applicant is competent to engage in the activity
and has the required expertise and resources;
* Regulating the location of potentially risky activities and ensur-
ing that they occur in places where risks to the public are mini-
mized;
* Ensuring that activities presenting serious threats to public
health or the environment can be prohibited (or have safety pre-
cautions placed on them) before harm occurs;
* Ensuring, through establishing a uniform review process for
every applicant, that the cumulative amount of a risky activity
121. See id. § 7409 (2006) (requiring EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) at a level that "protect[s] the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety"). In 2001,
the Supreme Court affirmed that the NAAQS are health-based standards that EPA must establish
without reliance on cost-benefit analysis. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 471
(2001).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2006).
123. See id. §§ 6901(b)(6), 6924(a)(6).
124. To be sure, there are also many examples of U.S. regulatory regimes grounded in precau-
tionary standard setting without a switch in the burden of proof, such as the initial establishment of the
NAAQS under the Clean Air Act. Id. § 7409. There are also many examples of ex post interventions,
such as the product recall authority of the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the authority of
the EPA to issue removal orders in response to hazardous substance releases. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)
(2006); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006). Taken as a whole, the U.S. approach to addressing health and en-
vironmental risks is a complex pastiche of different kinds of ex ante and ex post interventions.
125. Graham, supra note 56, at 5.
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does not exceed limits that would be damaging to the environ-
ment or human health; and
* Minimizing risks while further research is conducted and making
that research the responsibility of firms that will benefit the most
from the activity.
I am not trying to defend every permitting and licensing scheme, of
course. Government permitting programs can be burdensome and prone
to political favoritism and rent-seeking behavior. They are often com-
plex. If inadequately funded and staffed, a governmental review may be
no more than a fig leaf of risk management (witness the Deepwater Ho-
rizon Oil Spill and the lax oversight of the Minerals Management Serv-
ice). But the long-standing practice in U.S. law of establishing govern-
ment agencies as ex ante gatekeepers for risk does suggest that the Strong
Precautionary Principle cannot be so easily dismissed. It is not as alien to
U.S. law and values as the critics would have us believe, and it hardly
seems "paralyzing" in the many contexts in which it has been applied.
2. Countering the Critique of Extremism
Rather than seriously grapple with examples of Strong Precaution
in existing law, many critics instead challenge a straw man-a jumble of
extremist positions and hard-to-defend results that allegedly flow from
Strong Precaution. Critics frequently contend, for example, that the
Strong Precautionary Principle amounts to an intolerable command for
proponents of potentially harmful technologies to prove zero risk.126 As
Ronald Bailey charged, "manufacturers would have to prove that their
creations wouldn't cause harm-ever-to the environment or human
health before they would be allowed to offer them to the public."127 Ac-
cording to Bailey, this is like "demanding that a newborn baby prove that
it will never grow up to be a serial killer, or even just a schoolyard bul-
ly . . . ."12
Zero risk is an undesirable and unattainable goal.12 9 Regulators
rarely face a choice between risk and no risk. They must choose instead
among various options with different degrees of risk. There is nothing in
the Strong Precautionary Principle that precludes priority setting, and I
suggest some avenues for doing so in chemical regulation in Part III. To
claim that Strong Precaution is a zero-risk standard is merely to set the
126. See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and Its Pol-
icy Implications, 40 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 89, 101 (2002); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Pre-
cautionary Principle?, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 10790, 10791 (2001).
127. Bailey, supra note 59, at 39.
128. Id.
129. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,642 (1980) ("'[Slafe'
is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' There are many activities that we engage in every day-such as
driving a car or even breathing city air-that entail some risk of accident or material health impair-
ment, nevertheless, few people would consider these activities 'unsafe."').
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straw man on his post. Zero risk is an easy target to knock down, but it
misses the crux of the debate.
Sunstein is one detractor who paints the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple as almost comically extreme. After noting the acceptability of
weaker versions of the Precautionary Principle, he defines the Strong
Precautionary Principle as the view that "regulation is required when-
ever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if
the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the economic
costs of regulation are high."3 0
This is the definition of the "Precautionary Principle" that Sunstein
excoriates in his 2005 book, Laws of Fear, and in his major article in Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, in which he encourages us to move
"Beyond the Precautionary Principle.""' But notice that his definition is
far more extreme and risk averse than the Wingspread Statement, which
is widely considered to be emblematic of the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple. Sunstein's definition, commanding regulation for all "possible"
risks, even when based on "speculative" science, is a caricature of advo-
cates' arguments. Sunstein neglects that most formulations of Strong
Precaution specifically contemplate approval of activities that may pose
serious health or environmental threats, as long as their risks are justified
by their proponents as tolerable or within prescribed bounds. Strong
Precaution does not require the elimination of all risk nor the elimina-
tion of risk at any cost.
What Sunstein has done is to take, as the basis for his definition,
some of the most radical formulations of the Precautionary Principle ev-
er committed to paper.32 Because Sunstein defines the Strong Precau-
tionary Principle in this way, it is not surprising that he is able to attack it
at length. Revealingly, he states that the strongest versions of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, embodied in his own definition, might reflect "a po-
130. sUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 24; see also Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1018.
131. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Sunstein, supra note 15. In addition, at the end of Laws of Fear,
Sunstein described the Precautionary Principle as "a plea for aggressive regulation of risks that are
unlikely to come to fruition." SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 224.
132. In defining Strong Precaution, Sunstein relies on some rather obscure pronouncements as
representative examples of the Principle. In particular, Sunstein's definition of the Principle echoes
two obscure and highly risk-averse definitions that he discusses in Laws of Fear. See SUNSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 19-20 (quoting Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth, Address Before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services (Jan. 24,
2002) ("[T]he Precautionary Principle mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or envi-
ronmental damage . . , and when there is scientific uncertainty [about the risk], then decisions should
be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evidence
shows that the damage will not occur.")); Final Declaration of the First European Seas at Risk Confer-
ence, Oct. 26-28, 1994, Annex 1, 1 4. ("[I]f the 'worst case scenario' for a certain activity is serious
enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking
place."). Sunstein describes both formulations of Strong Precaution as being at the "extreme" end of a
continuum. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 18. Such statements have never had much influence on the
practical design of regulatory regimes in the United States. Nonetheless, Sunstein incorporates strik-
ingly similar language into his own definition of the Strong Precautionary Principle, and then proceeds
to attack it. See id. at 18-20.
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sition that no one is ultimately willing to hold."133 This raises the ques-
tion of why he has adopted that definition as his foil, rather than defini-
tions of the Principle more widely accepted in the literature.
Most formulations of the Strong Precautionary Principle, including
my own definition and that of the Wingspread Statement, offer far more
flexibility than this extreme portrait painted by the critics.'3 The Strong
Precautionary Principle does not impose a burden on any party to prove
zero risk, nor does it state that all activities that pose a possible risk must
be prohibited. Rather, the Principle, while shifting the burden of proof
away from government, deliberately leaves the relevant standard of
proof open-ended and subject to democratic deliberation. The Principle
requires that a proponent demonstrate that its product or activity meets a
specified standard (predetermined through legislation) for how much
risk is tolerable or acceptable in a given issue area.
This standard of proof can be set in a variety of ways, just as govern-
ing risk standards vary considerably in current public health and envi-
ronmental statutes, which may prescribe specific safety technologies, set
performance benchmarks, impose cost-benefit tests, or set minimal
health-based standards.13 1 In some cases, policy makers might choose to
adopt a cost-benefit test within a Strong Precautionary framework, re-
quiring the applicant to show that the benefits of its activity outweigh po-
tential harms. The Strong Precautionary Principle is not necessarily anti-
thetical to cost-benefit analysis, though it has often been framed this way
in the literature. Under a Strong Precautionary framework, cost-benefit
analysis could still be conducted, but it would be the applicant, rather
than the government, who would carry both the analytical burden of
conducting the analysis and the burden of persuasion. Utilitarian welfare
maximization would remain the ultimate goal of the process, but in con-
trast to the way cost-benefit analysis is traditionally performed, some ex
ante precautionary restrictions would be imposed on the activity until the
applicant has met its burden to prove that the activity is worth the risks.
There are many options other than cost-benefit balancing that could
be used to implement the Strong Precautionary Principle in concrete leg-
islation. In situations where both the probability of harm and the nature
of the outcomes are uncertain, cost-benefit balancing is accomplished on-
ly through heroic modeling assumptions that obscure the underlying un-
certainties and value choices.'1 Cost-benefit analysis also deals awk-
133. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 24.
134. The Wingspread Statement, for example, provides that the burden of proof shall be borne by
the proponent of the activity, but it does not itself supply the standard for determining when the bur-
den of proof is met. Id. at 19.
135. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (stating that the EPA
must prove "unreasonable risk" to restrict a chemical); Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)
(2006) (stating that the EPA is required to set ambient air quality standards at a level "requisite to
protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety").
136. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 10 (2004) ("Cost-benefit analysis of health and environ-
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wardly with equity concerns, including inter-generational equity. It
sends a "go" signal to activities that may externalize billions of dollars in
health costs on a population, as long as the related benefits in corporate
profits and employment are higher than the expected costs. This. Article
is not meant as a comprehensive critique of cost-benefit analysis, but it
does highlight why it is appropriate to establish precautionary risk man-
agement regimes that do not rest on such analysis-and not just for a
narrow class of "catastrophic" risks.137
Utilitarian welfare maximization need not be the driving goal of
every regulatory regime, and the Strong Precautionary Principle can in-
corporate a wider variety of goals and values. For example, a statute
might require the applicant to prove that the proposed activity will not
cause substantial harm to human health, that it will incorporate best-
available safety or pollution control technology, or that it will not sub-
stantially harm significant ecosystems.118 In the hazardous waste context,
the Principle would not forbid a firm from engaging in long-term storage
of hazardous waste nor would it require complex cost-benefit balancing
for each individual storage facility. Rather, the Principle, quite sensibly,
would impose a default prohibition on long-term hazardous-waste stor-
age until the firm can demonstrate, ex ante, that the storage will be con-
ducted safely-meaning in accordance with prescribed standards for con-
struction, monitoring, financial security, labeling, and emergency re-
sponse. The Principle is contextual and pragmatic. It allows policy mak-
ers to assess the seriousness of risks and to develop appropriate re-
mental protection rests on simplistic, implausible hypotheses... ."); KYSAR, supra note 64, at 71-75
(contrasting situations of "risk," which can be modeled reasonably well because outcomes and proba-
bilities are well defined, with situations of "uncertainty" and "ignorance," typical in environmental
policy making, in which probabilities are poorly defined).
137. Sunstein "reconstructs" the Precautionary Principle as an Anti-Catastrophe Principle, and he
argues that so reconstructed, his Anti-Catastrophe Principle "deserves to play a role in regulatory
choices." SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 114. His description in Laws of Fear of how an Anti-
Catastrophe Principle might operate is quite vague, however. He contends that policy makers should
identify and then address worst-case scenario risks, but only when that scenario is in some sense "cata-
strophic," and even then, only "when the costs of reducing those dangers are not huge and when incur-
ring those costs does not divert resources from more pressing problems." Id. But this leaves a very
small scope for precautionary thinking in regulatory law, since addressing catastrophic risks (his pri-
mary example is global warming) will almost always necessitate large costs. Moreover, the Strong Pre-
cautionary Principle, properly understood, has much wider applications than addressing planet-
altering "catastrophic" risks affecting hundreds of millions of people. As the examples in this Article
illustrate, the Principle can be applied in a variety of contexts on a more quotidian basis to protect
health and safety.
138. That Strong Precaution may introduce values other than strict economic efficiency into the
regulatory process is one of the reasons it has drawn such heated criticism. But many existing health,
safety, and environmental statutes also impose requirements other than strict cost-benefit tests, such as
the use of minimum safety equipment, the adoption of best-available technology, or the avoidance of
significant risk. See statutes cited supra notes 114-124. As Sunstein himself has noted, a democratic
society may appropriately set regulatory standards with reference to values other than economic effi-
ciency. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 129 ("Efficiency is relevant, but it is hardly the only goal of
regulation. Citizens in a democratic society might well choose to protect endangered species, or wild-
life, or pristine areas, even if it is not efficient for them to do so.").
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sponses in a much more qualitative way than staunch advocates of a cost-
benefit test would tolerate.
The governing risk standard-what, exactly, the proponent must
show or prove-is not set forth in the Principle itself, but rather in im-
plementing legislation, enacted through democratic processes. Sunstein
and other critics are asking far too much from a brief principle when they
criticize it for failing to answer complex questions about the valuation of
human life"' or the distributional consequences of risk decision mak-
ing.140 The Principle was never intended for these purposes; the proper
venue for resolution of these questions is implementing legislation.141
In addition to providing flexibility to design risk standards, the
Strong Precautionary Principle also affords flexibility to design default
regulatory responses in the time period before the proponent has met the
burden of proof. The extremist critique suggests that the only response
of regulators, acting in accordance with the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple, is to ban activities that pose possible or potential risks.142 But the
Strong Precautionary Principle can be implemented through a variety of
defaults beyond simplistic, binary (ban or no-ban) choices.143 Appropri-
ate defaults might include partial prohibitions, worker-safety precau-
tions, locational restrictions, or warnings. Even where a regulatory re-
gime provides for a default policy of complete prohibition (as is the case
with FDA drug reviews, EPA pesticide registration, and most govern-
mental licensing and permitting programs), the Strong Precautionary
139. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 95, at 6 ("Without helping to answer" questions such as the
tradeoff between present and future risks and the valuation of a life, "the principle is not useful.").
140. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 51 ("[Tlhe Precautionary Principle is a crude, indirect, and
sometimes perverse way of incorporating distributional concerns."). But see Applegate, Climate
Change, supra note 22, at 176 (arguing that it is "patently not [the] purpose" of the Precautionary
Principle to resolve distributional concerns).
141. The necessity of interpretation through implementation does not, however, carve out so
much from the Principle itself that the Principle dissolves into vacuity, as discussed in Part I. See also
David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw U. L. REV.
1315, 1317 ("Principles can express and reinforce value commitments and procedurally structure deci-
sionmaking without dictating a single set of specific, substantive outcomes ... ." (emphasis omitted)).
Moreover, in existing legislation that incorporates a Strong Precautionary approach, the burden that
the proponent or applicant must carry is typically substantial. There is little point in shifting the bur-
den of proof, of course, if the ultimate burden the proponent must carry is a de minimis one. In the ex
ante regulatory regimes described supra, the proponent bears a substantial burden to prove that risks
or impacts will be within acceptable bounds-a burden that normally takes significant investment of
time and resources to meet. The burden-shifting mechanism therefore does real "work" in allocating
responsibilities.
142. Kogan, supra note 39, at 494 (The Precautionary Principle "favors banning or severely re-
stricting broad classes of substances, products, and activities if it is merely possible that they .. .pose
potentially serious but unknown health or environmental harm."); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning
Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265,270 n.31 (2009) ("A strong precautionary prin-
ciple might .. . ban environmentally threatening activities.").
143. Indeed, it would be a gross waste of resources to implement the same precautionary meas-
ures for chemicals whose effects on human health cannot be determined with accuracy as for chemicals
that are known carcinogens. "Precautionary measures should be taken in both cases, but with differ-
ent degrees of stringency." Hansson, supra note 23, at 224.
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Principle clearly provides that the default can be overcome by proof of
acceptable risks submitted by the applicant.
3. Countering the Critique of "Paralysis"
No one seriously disputes that regulation has opportunity costs, and
no serious scholar of risk regulation believes that opportunity costs
should be ignored. The FDA's approval process for new drugs, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration's pilot and airport licensing requirements,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission's registration requirements
for securities all consume public and private sector resources that cannot
be deployed elsewhere. Stringent regulation of one activity, moreover,
might lead private parties toward substitute activities that pose risks of
their own.
The presence of tradeoffs, however, does not mean that the Strong
Precautionary Principle is incoherent or paralyzing. Because of the cen-
trality of the "paralysis" theme in the critical literature, I devote substan-
tial attention to that critique here before turning to my proposal for re-
forms to TSCA.
Several scholars have already examined how policy makers can ad-
dress tradeoffs in a way that is consistent with the Precautionary Prin-
ciple. David Dana has suggested, for example, that the Precautionary
Principle helps us choose among alternative regulatory actions (including
no action) by countering the cognitive tendency to avoid decisions that
involve upfront costs and more distant benefits.1 " Steffen Foss Hansen
and Joel Tickner have argued that true risk-risk tradeoffs are less preva-
lent than the critics have alleged, 145 and John Applegate has asserted that
even where risks inhere on many different sides of a decision, the Pre-
cautionary Principle still plays a useful role by ruling out arguments that
all decisions should be postponed due to scientific uncertainty." In a
thoughtful examination of risk-risk tradeoffs, Doug Kysar has noted that
while the opportunity costs of regulation must be considered, the Precau-
tionary Principle offers a more contextual, dynamic approach for making
these tradeoffs than cost-benefit analysis. 147 The Precautionary Principle,
according to Kysar, approaches complex tradeoffs through deliberation,
144. Dana, supra note 141, at 1333 ("[T]he precautionary principle may have a role to play as a
corrective of cognitive biases" in situations where we face "choices between the avoidance of sure,
immediate losses and the avoidances of unsure, future losses.").
145. See Steffen Foss Hansen & Joel A. Tickner, Putting Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in Perspective: A
Response to Graham and Wiener, 11 J. RISK RES. 475, 476 (2008) (arguing that many purported risk-
risk tradeoffs are hypothetical, never emerged in practice, or were adequately addressed through pre-
cautionary regulation).
146. Applegate, Climate Change, supra note 22, at 173, 183--84 (explaining that the function of the
Precautionary Principle is primarily procedural and evidentiary).
147. Kysar, supra note 22, at 9 ("Undoubtedly, CBA proponents are correct to note that no socie-
ty should flatly ignore the opportunity costs of precautionary regulation. But this is a trivial observa-
tion, for no serious proponent of the [Precautionary Principle] disagrees with it.").
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moral reflection, and appreciation of the limits of human cognition, while
cost-benefit analysis "proceeds awkwardly in the absence of fully charac-
terized risks" and involves questionable monetization of environmental
and health harms.148
I do not intend to revisit these arguments in detail here. Instead, I
offer two responses, underdeveloped in prior literature, to the critique
that Strong Precaution is paralyzing for risk decision making-responses
that are particularly pertinent to the field of chemical regulation.
a. The Problem of Tradeoffs in Legislation
My first response is that the detailed, quantitative risk tradeoff
analysis that Sunstein, Wiener, Graham, and other critics advocate is of-
ten difficult to implement, as a practical matter, within the legislative
process. Enactment of legislation is both the primary focus of this Ar-
ticle and the proper focus of analysis of the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple. The Principle should be viewed primarily as a framework to guide
legislators, rather than a framework to guide regulators, because, at least
in U.S. law, the shift in the burden of proof usually requires some legisla-
tive authorization.149
In deciding whether to enact a new statute, legislators should of
course attempt to identify the tradeoffs involved, including opportunity
costs and any countervailing risks. They should also seek to identify an-
cillary benefits from legislation, other than the intended target effects.'
This is simply good decision making.
There is a limited ability, however, in the run-up to passage of new
legislation, for legislators or their staffs to perform a comprehensive cost-
148. Id. at 10.
149. Scholarship on weak versions of the Precautionary Principle has focused overwhelmingly on
the decisions of regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fisher & Ronnie Harding, The Precautionary
Principle and Administrative Constitutionalism: The Development of Frameworks for Applying the
Precautionary Principle, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PERSPECTIVES AND
PROSPECTs 113, 116 (Elizabeth Fisher et al. eds., 2006) (The Principle applies to "administrative activi-
ties" that are "delegated by a primary law maker to a non-elected secondary law maker."). The
Strong Precautionary Principle, however, more directly addresses legislative design, given that the key
choices, such as the degree of risk that will trigger burden shifting and the showing that must be made
to overcome default prohibitions, are usually legislative choices.
150. Interest in risk-risk tradeoff analysis arose in the 1980s and 1990s in tandem with the rise of
cost-benefit analysis in regulatory decision making, and, according to some scholars, risk-risk tradeoff
analysis consequently developed a distinct antiregulatory bias. Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Re-
vesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety
Regulation, 69 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1763, 1793 (2002). In particular, Rascoff and Revesz find bias in the
identification of the countervailing risks from regulation, without attention to the ancillary benefits of
regulation. As an illustrative example of ancillary benefits, they explain that statutes aimed at reduc-
ing carbon dioxide emissions, through fuel switching or energy efficiency measures, would also lead to
reductions in conventional pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and ozone. Id. at 1808. They conclude
that "[r]isk tradeoffs and ancillary benefits are simply mirror images of each other. There is no justifi-
cation for privileging the former and ignoring the latter." Id. at 1793.
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benefit analysis on all possible decision-making paths. 5' Legislators can-
not easily predict, for example, how citizens and firms will adjust their
behavior in response to various legislative options. Indeed, in enacting a
regulatory regime based on delegated authority, legislators cannot be
sure of the stringency of the regulations that will be promulgated by an
administrative agency, nor can they predict which particular products or
activities will be prohibited or allowed, because these decisions will
usually be made years later by the agency. Therefore, it is often impossi-
ble for legislators to know, in advance, the costs and benefits of different
legislative proposals. It is often impossible for legislators to know, in ad-
vance, whether Bill A will lead to a Pareto-superior suite of risk reduc-
tions compared to Bill B (assuming they are even cognizant of these sub-
tleties).152 Moreover, monetizing projected risk reductions and esti-
mating the cost of legislation is notoriously difficult for environmental
and public health statutes.53
Risk tradeoff analysis depends on being able to accurately charac-
terize risk and monetize the expected value of all projected harms. If,
however, there is credible evidence of serious risk from a certain tech-
nology or activity, yet probabilities cannot be attached and dollar values
cannot be assigned, we are in the realm of vast uncertainty-precisely the
realm where Strong Precaution has the most salience. What is called for
in these situations is caution, humility, and a framework that protects
public health and the environment while further research is conducted.
151. While cost-benefit analysis is mandated for the major rules of federal regulatory agencies
through executive order, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), Congress has
chosen, wisely, not to bind itself formally to that requirement through its own rules of procedure.
152. Even in the regulatory arena, where formal risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are
strongly institutionalized in U.S. law, it is often difficult to forecast risk-risk tradeoffs or to estimate
their magnitude. Consider a risk-risk tradeoff explored by Sunstein in a 2002 article: promulgating
strict standards for arsenic (ten parts per billion or less) under the Safe Drinking Water Act might in-
centivize households, because of the expense of complying with the standard, to switch to private wells
that often contain polluted or contaminated water. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90
GEO. L.J. 2255, 2271, 2294-95 (2002). Sunstein describes this as a classic risk-risk tradeoff and reports
that EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman "expressed concern" about this possibility in a tele-
vision interview. Id. at 2294. But he does not explain how that risk-risk tradeoff could be quantified.
It is doubtful that regulators could quantify how many users might actually switch to private wells, how
polluted private wells are in those communities, and how users' health would be affected by exposure
to diverse contaminants in private wells. This is just one example of a broader problem in risk-risk
tradeoff analysis: while it may be possible to spot the existence of a countervailing risk from regulation,
it can be exceedingly difficult to quantify it. Nonetheless, the presence of potential countervailing
risks can be used as a rhetorical scare tactic to stop introduction of needed health and safety regula-
tion.
153. Even in an ideal world where legislators could presciently name all the benefits and costs
(including countervailing risks) that might flow from legislation, monetizing the benefit side of the
equation (e.g., ecosystems protected, cancers or birth defects avoided, or life years saved) is notorious-
ly problematic. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 136; KYSAR, supra note 64; Mandel
& Gathii, supra note 22, at 1045-46 (describing hurdles of uncertainty and valuation in conducting
cost-benefit analysis); Percival, supra note 22, at 31-32 (noting that the imperative to quantify the costs
and benefits of regulation "may distort decision-makers' perceptions of the levels of uncertainty asso-
ciated with them").
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In contexts of serious potential risks and significant uncertainty, a
mandate for government to conduct comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
on all potential decision options may have pernicious results. Policy
makers, under pressure from well-financed contributors and interest
groups, may simply delay addressing those harms to human health or the
environment that scientists have identified as being serious.'" The quest
for quantifying all tradeoffs-what Donald Hornstein has called "super
synopticism"'-may lead to a different kind of "paralysis" than the one
that Sunstein says is inherent in Strong Precaution: paralysis by analy-
sis.16
This concern-that protective health and environmental legislation
will be undermined by demands for comprehensive risk tradeoff analy-
sis-is not just hypothetical. The primary reason that the EPA has be-
come crippled in its ability to restrict chemicals already on the market is
that TSCA commands the EPA to perform extensive cost-benefit balanc-
ing on any decision to restrict a chemical, including identifying the "least
burdensome" alternative that will address the risk."' The courts have in-
terpreted this requirement to mean that the agency must conduct cost-
benefit analysis not only on a proposed restriction of a chemical, but also
on a tiered ladder of other possible regulatory alternatives with varying
stringency. 58 The massive information needs of such a task have meant,
in practice, that the EPA has not been able to pull known hazardous sub-
154. Use of phthalates in children's toys provides another example of how the presence of trade-
offs need not be paralyzing to decision making. Phthalates, used to soften plastics, are known to be
endocrine-disrupting chemicals that can disrupt normal development of sex organs. See Ernie Hood,
Are EDC's Blurring Issues of Gender?, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A670, A671 (2005). For this rea-
son, in 2008, Congress banned several classes of phthalates in children's toys, baby bottles, pacifiers,
and other items. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (2006). It is
conceivable, though speculative, that banning phthalates in children's toys could result in toy manufac-
turers substituting a more hazardous chemical instead. It is also foreseeable that the ban could lead to
some job loss in the affected baby care industries or in the chemical industry. But Congress was not
and should not be "paralyzed" by these possibilities of a risk "on the other side." There is nothing in
the Precautionary Principle (weak or strong versions) that mandates that the scientifically documented
risks of children's exposures to phthalates must be given the same weight in decision making as more
speculative countervailing risks. The potential of a countervailing risk should not be used to forestall
regulation of risks that we do know about. Moreover, the best solution here is not to accept our ig-
norance of the alternatives, but rather to require a minimum toxicity data set on a wide universe of
chemicals so that the risks of phthalates and any potential alternative chemical in children's toys can
actually be compared to each other.
155. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Poli-
tics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 386-87 (1993); see also Bradley C. Kark-
kainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 81-82 (2008)
(criticizing "comprehensive bureaucratic rationality" as an approach to risk).
156. See, e.g., Hansen & Tickner, supra note 145, at 477 ("[I1t is useful to consider realistic and
reasonable risk-risk tradeoffs but... this should not keep us from acting on a risk for which there is
scientific evidence indicating concerns."); see also Percival, supra note 22, at 79 (rejecting the proposi-
tion that "a never-ending quest for improved information should indefinitely postpone sensible regula-
tory measures"); Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 150.
157. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
15& See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A., 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991).
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stances off the market, including asbestos,'59 which is classified as a
known carcinogen by both the National Toxicology Program and the In-
ternational Agency for Research on Cancer.'" The U.S. environmental
statute most committed to cost-benefit balancing for toxic risks is the one
that has been the least effective in addressing them.
Despite the lethargic and unprotective track record of TSCA, Sun-
stein continues to advocate careful cost-benefit balancing in chemical
regulation to determine whether a particular hazardous substance should
be restricted from the marketplace. According to Sunstein, government
regulators should compare a chemical's risk to human well-being with
the benefits we gain from the chemical. 6' But as Congress takes up
TSCA reform, it must recognize that continuing to rely on chemical-by-
chemical cost-benefit balancing, with a governmental burden of proof is
tantamount to unprecautionary regulation.
Moreover, the argument that restrictions on a particular chemical
may have both costs and benefits does nothing to undermine the utility
of the Strong Precautionary Principle as the guiding rubric for the overall
field of chemical regulation. Legislatures confront policy choices at a
much higher level of generality than Sunstein's concern about whether to
allow or restrict a particular substance. In federal toxics policy, the legis-
lative task is not to perform a utilitarian calculus on the costs and bene-
fits of banning or restricting specific chemicals. It is to determine the
best legislative architecture for assessing and managing the risks of the
universe of 84,000 chemicals that have been introduced into commerce.
The questions that Congress confronts at the legislative stage are
much broader than the substance-specific inquiry that Sunstein advo-
cates, and here, Congress need not be paralyzed in pursuing a goal of
caution in the face of risk, even with the knowledge that caution will
have its costs. Congress must determine what decision-making proce-
dures and default rules should be put in place for all chemical substances
subject to the statute. What kinds of rules would be protective of human
health and the environment, given what we know about chemical expo-
sures and toxicity? What kinds of authorities should be given to regula-
tors to compel testing? Who should bear the burden of proof? What
must chemical manufacturers show about the risks of a chemical prior to
marketing? Should there be trade secret exemptions from public disclo-
159. See discussion of Corrosion Proof Fittings, infra Part II.
160. See Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER Soc'y, http://www.cancer.org/
Cancer/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/GenerallnformationaboutCarcinogens/known-and-
probable-human-carcinogens (last updated Feb. 17,2011).
161. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 708 (2005) ("[Tjhere is general agreement
that whether a particular substance ought to be regulated depends on the overall effect of regulation
on human well-being."). Note that Sunstein and Vermeule restrict this calculus to "human well-
being," leaving impacts on nonhuman species out of the equation. Id.
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sure of toxicity data? What kinds of toxicity tests will be acceptable for
risk assessment?
These are fundamental value choices, not easily subjected to mone-
tization or cost-benefit analysis. Legislators must, in the end, make a dif-
ficult judgment about the best approach to a particular class of risks, one
that "represents the self-expressed commitments of an integrated politi-
cal community."16 2 Legislators should consider knowable tradeoffs where
they can be quantified, but they should also view their role as more than
utility maximizers, summing up individual preferences. The need to ac-
cept agency and responsibility in decision making is particularly acute in
the enactment of environmental legislation, which raises fundamental
questions about duties to current and future generations and stewardship
of ecosystems.'63
A crucial threshold judgment that a legislative body must make in
the design of a public health or environmental statute is whether to im-
plement a Strong Precautionary approach-in which a government agen-
cy is placed in a risk gatekeeping role with the burden of proof on the
applicant. Or, on the other hand, a legislature might decide that a par-
ticular arena of risk should be addressed through more laissez-faire
mechanisms, by some minimal post-market supervisory authority of a
government agency, or perhaps by no regulation at all.
Recall Sunstein's contention that because regulation may cause
risks of its own, or deprive society of some significant benefits, "stringent
regulation would actually run afoul of the Precautionary Principle."'6
Some examples from outside environmental law help to illustrate why
legislators need not be paralyzed in choosing to implement a Strong Pre-
cautionary framework.
Consider first the licensing of doctors and nurses. There is clearly a
risk-risk tradeoff in a decision on whether to enact a licensing statute,
with human lives at stake "on all sides" of the choice, to use a favorite
phrase of the critics.1 6 Not requiring a license could result in untrained
people performing surgeries and prescribing medications. Yet, requiring
a license clearly limits the supply of doctors and nurses, which could put
lives at risk in medically underserved communities.'"
162. KYSAR, supra note 64, at 239.
163. In environmental law, Congress has frequently acted to protect natural resources and human
health without engaging in comprehensive risk-risk analysis or cost-benefit balancing. Doug Kysar has
noted, for example, that the Clean Water Act's command not to degrade the nation's pristine waters is
a fairly absolute one that does not consider tradeoffs regarding how this protection might limit eco-
nomic development. Id. at 248. The Endangered Species Act can also be seen as a deontological,
nonutilitarian statute reflecting a national value that species should be protected. Id.
164. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 29.
165. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1054.
166. Strict medical licensing requirements could easily lead to adverse health outcomes for pa-
tients. The Department of Health and Human Services has reported that sixty-five million Americans
live in "Health Profession Shortage Areas," and that it would take an additional 16,643 primary care
physicians in these areas to serve the populations adequately. See Shortage Designation: HPSAs,
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But why should applying the Strong Precautionary Principle be
"paralyzing" here? Would we really say that either decision would be
equally precautionary, or that a precautionary legislator would find it
impossible to decide? Consistent with the Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple, legislators have made a judgment (in all fifty states) that it is better
to have a default rule prohibiting unlicensed medical practice, with the
applicant bearing the burden of proof on their qualifications for the li-
cense,' 67 rather than to allow any person to practice medicine and then
respond to any resulting harm on an ex post basis. We do not consider
costs and benefits in deciding whether a particular nurse or doctor should
be allowed to enter the market for medical services (the kind of indivi-
dualized determination that Sunstein has advocated for chemical sub-
stances). We instead implement a firm rule that applies to all practition-
ers in every state: if you want to practice medicine, you must bear the
burden to prove, ex ante, that you have the required skills, training, and
knowledge. That there are some inevitable tradeoffs in grounding medi-
cal licensing rules in the Strong Precautionary Principle does not eviscer-
ate the coherence of Strong Precaution as an approach to risk.
As another example of why a Strong Precautionary approach need
not be "paralyzing" in the presence of tradeoffs, consider federal and
state laws on operation of new airports, which require applicants to re-
ceive ex ante government approval for construction and operation.168 The
goals of such statutes are to avoid overcrowding in the skies resulting
from locating airports too close to each other and to guarantee some
minimal safety standards for airport facilities.169 Under federal law, the
FAA does not determine whether the benefits of a proposed airport
(measured in terms of economic growth, tax revenue, or recreational en-
joyment) exceed the potential risks. 70 Rather, airport preapproval stat-
utes are prescriptive. They say to the operator: given potential serious
threats to public safety from a poorly located or poorly operated airport,
MUAs & MUPs, HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/ (last updated May
28,2010).
167. See, for example, the medical licensing statutes of New York and Texas, which are virtually
identical to the other states. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6501 (McKinney 2010) (requiring a license to practice
medicine); Id. § 6512 (stating that it is a felony to practice medicine without a license); TEx. Occ.
CODE ANN. § 155.001 (West 2007) (describing procedures for issuance of medical licenses); Id.
§ 165.152 (stating that it is a felony to practice medicine without a license).
168. See Notice of Construction, Alteration, Activation, and Deactivation of Airports, 14 C.F.R.
§ 157 (2010); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANS. & FAA, NOTICE OF LANDING AREA PROPOSAL, FAA Form 7480-
1, http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/medialform/faa7480-1.pdf; MINN. STAT. § 360.018 (2010)
("The general public interest and safety, the safety of ... persons and property on the ground, and the
interest of aeronautical progress [require] . . . that airports, restricted landing areas, and air navigation
facilities should be suitable for the purposes for which they are designed .... ); MINN. R. 8800.1400
(2007) (establishing notification and licensing requirements for new airports).
169. See Part 157 Notice of Construction, Alteration, Activation, and Deactivation, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/airports/centrallengineering/partl57/ (last updated Apr. 12, 2010) ("Noti-
fication allows the FAA to identify potential aeronautical hazards in advance thus preventing or
minimizing the adverse impacts to the safe and efficient use of navigable airspace.").
170. See id.
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government will hold you to specific safety standards and forbid you
from engaging in airport operation until you can prove that your facility
meets the standards, even if there are significant foregone economic bene-
fits from prohibiting airport operation."' The Strong Precautionary Prin-
ciple's salutary signals are very much present here-legislators demand
compliance with minimum safety standards, place the burden of proof on
the applicant to show that risks will be acceptable, and allow vigorous
competition to occur within that framework.
b. Addressing Tradeoffs Within Precautionary Legislation
My second response to the criticism that Strong Precaution neces-
sarily ignores risk-risk tradeoffs is that such tradeoffs can often be ad-
dressed within regulatory regimes grounded in Strong Precaution. In-
deed, the shift in the burden of proof to proponents may highlight policy
alternatives that may not come to light under traditional decision-making
frameworks.
There are numerous examples of permitting, licensing, and preap-
proval statutes that implement a default prohibition on a certain targeted
activity, yet also contain procedures to address known countervailing
risks of the prohibition. In drug approvals, for example, the FDA has
developed three separate programs (fast track, accelerated approval, and
priority review) to reduce "drug-lag," shortening the time in which
breakthrough drugs can move to market.172 Pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers under those programs still cannot market a new drug until they re-
ceive FDA approval, but they proceed down a separate and faster track
within the agency. 17  Environmental statutes that rely on licensing and
preapproval mechanisms are replete with "minor source," "minor use,"
and "experimental use" exemptions, to avoid applying strict research,
preapproval, and pollution control requirements to activities that, as a
class, pose less severe risks.174
In arguing that the presence of risk-risk tradeoffs makes precaution
incoherent, Sunstein, Graham, Wiener, Cross, and other critics often
171. See id.
172. Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review: Accelerating the Availability of New
Drugs for Patients with Serious Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/For
Consumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstolmportantNewTherapies/ucml282
91.htm (last updated May 28, 2010).
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136p (2006) (granting emergency use exemptions from the regis-
tration and preapproval process for pesticides); id. § 136c (2006) (outlining experimental use exemp-
tions); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006) (applying preconstruction review requirements of the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program only to "major emitting facilities," defined by pollu-
tant tonnage thresholds); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. H§ 6921, 6924
(2006) (outlining less-stringent storage and labeling requirements for "small quantity generators" and
"conditionally exempt small quantity generators").
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point to the same example: DDT."' The critics explain that banning
DDT could lead to increased deaths from malaria in the developing
world."' Given this countervailing risk of a DDT ban, critics suggest, a
goal of caution is paralyzing."' Is it cautious to ban DDT or to do the
opposite? When international negotiators actually confronted this trade-
off in the design of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pol-
lutants, they formalized a global ban on the production and use of DDT
and then provided an exception for parties that register their intent to
continue to use DDT for mosquito control."' Through permitting opt-
outs from the global ban, negotiators achieved a compromise that ad-
dresses both the target risk (environmental and health harms from DDT)
and one countervailing risk of a ban (malaria).
Strong Precaution does not inexorably lead to abdication of judg-
ment. It does not doom legislators to extremist positions in which
known, countervailing risks and the costs of legislation must be ignored.
Rather, as the above examples illustrate, legislators can structure a
Strong Precautionary regulatory regime to address both the "target risk"
and countervailing risks.
For a particularly elegant example of this in chemical regulation,
consider REACH, the EU chemical legislation discussed previously."'
The EU explicitly grounded the legislation in the Precautionary Prin-
ciple,'80 and the legislation relies heavily on burden shifting. In particu-
lar, REACH imposes a default sunset date after which a chemical identi-
fied as a "very high concern" substance cannot be marketed in the EU.1m'
"Very high concern" is a term of art, defined in REACH in reference to
the intrinsic properties and hazards of the chemical (such as carcinogen-
icity or bioaccumulative properties).'8 REACH further provides that
chemical manufacturers can overcome the default and receive authoriza-
tion to market a "very high concern" chemical through demonstrating,
among other things, that the socioeconomic benefits of the chemical ex-
ceed potential costs.183
175. See INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 26-27 (2001); SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 32; Cross, supra note
88, at 890-91; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 161, at 707; see also RICHARD TREN & ROGER BATE,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., WHEN POLITICS KILLS: MALARIA AND THE DDT STORY 25-26 (2000),
http://cei.org/PDFs/malaria.pdf.
176. See GOKLANY, supra note 175, at 27; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 32-33; Cross, supra note
88, at 890-91.
177. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 32-33; see also GOKLANY, supra note 175, at 27.
178. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Annex B.II, May 22-23, 2001,
opened for signature May 23, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532 (2001). Under Annex B.11 of the Convention, con-
tinued use of DDT is subject to developing an implementation plan that includes a search for suitable
alternatives to DDT. Id.
179. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
180. See REACH, supra note 75, at 396.
181. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 1837-38 (providing an overview of REACH).
182. Id. at 1837.
183. Id. at 1838.
1324 [Vol. 2011
No. 4] RESCUING THE STRONG PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
REACH provides an important reminder that a Strong Precaution-
ary regulatory regime need not preclude consideration of the costs and
benefits of regulation. In a twist on prevailing approaches in the United
States, however, REACH shifts the burden of conducting the cost-
benefit analysis to the manufacturer that seeks to continue to market a
chemical substance with known hazardous properties.' REACH also
requires that manufacturers, in the authorization process, analyze wheth-
er less hazardous substitute chemicals exist.' In this way, the "stop and
think" mechanism of Strong Precaution, far from ignoring tradeoffs, be-
comes the spur for a formal alternatives analysis that has never been a
prominent part of U.S. chemical regulation.
C. The Limits of Strong Precaution
The Strong Precautionary Principle provides a framework to protect
public health and safety, and some advocates of the Principle naturally
want to universalize it as a guiding polestar for all areas of risk. As the
authors of the Wingspread Statement put it, "[c]orporations, government
entities, organizations, communities, scientists, and other individuals
must adopt a precautionary approach to all human endeavors."586
The Principle has some significant limitations, however, and it needs
to be applied judiciously. For one thing, many forms of human health
and environmental risks have no "proponent" to which the burden of
proof can be shifted. Consider natural disasters, the spread of contagious
disease, or the remediation of historic contamination at a hazardous
waste site. We need government to take appropriate preparations for
these risks, and in the case of historic waste sites, to set appropriate
cleanup standards, but there is no private "proponent of the activity"
who can bear the burden of proof. Climate change is another example of
a problem not easily addressed through burden-shifting mechanisms. A
climate change strategy must include promoting energy efficiency and
pricing greenhouse gas emissions," and arguments over burden of proof
would merely distract from those urgent national tasks.",
184. Id.; see also Wagner, supra note 87, at 473 (noting that a system in which cost-benefit analysis
is used by manufacturers to rebut precautionary health-based regulation would be consistent with the
Precautionary Principle).
185. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 1841-42 (discussing REACH's incentives for development of
substitutes for hazardous chemicals).
186. See, e.g., PROTECTING PUBLIc HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 23 app. A, at 353
(emphasis added). The context of this quotation makes it clear that the authors were describing the
Strong Precautionary Principle, as the Wingspread Statement goes on to provide a definition of pre-
caution that includes burden shifting. See id. at 353-54.
187. See Noah M. Sachs, Greening Demand: Energy Consumption and U.S. Climate Policy, DUKE
ENVTL L. & POL'Y F. 295,298 (2009).
188. I do not mean to minimize the role of precautionary steps in addressing climate change.
Policy making should still be guided by weaker versions of the Precautionary Principle, allowing early
action in the face of scientific uncertainty. For more on the role of precaution in the climate debate,
see Applegate, Climate Change, supra note 22.
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A second reason that Strong Precaution should not be viewed as
universally applicable is that putting government in a risk gatekeeping
role can be complex, potentially anticompetitive, and expensive. PhD-
level government personnel would often be needed to review risk data
compiled by private parties and to determine (subject to layers of judicial
review) whether the proponent has met its burden of proof. The expan-
sion of agency bureaucracy that would result from indiscriminate appli-
cation of Strong Precaution would be a counterintuitive outcome from a
principle designed to shift the burden of proof away from government.
For these reasons, the gatekeeping mechanism of the Strong Pre-
cautionary Principle should be reserved for serious threats that cannot be
addressed through less intrusive mechanisms. For many forms of risk,
there is no need to resort to the aggressive ex ante approach to risk im-
plicit in the Strong Precautionary Principle. Consider, for example, per-
forming surgery, marketing a dangerous recreational activity (e.g., sky
diving), or marketing a dangerous power tool (e.g., chainsaw, jackham-
mer). These all raise serious safety risks, but the liability system, insur-
ance, and tort-based deterrence have performed reasonably well for ad-
dressing these risks in the United States. There is no need to institute
complex legal mechanisms for risks that are already being handled ac-
ceptably through less aggressive means.
The most pressing issue for legislators, therefore, is how to make
the fundamental judgment alluded to in the prior section: determining
when it makes sense, despite attendant complexity, to implement the
Strong Precautionary Principle as the basis for a risk regulatory regime.
Relevant criteria should include the administrative costs of establishing
an ex ante review mechanism; the suitability of tort remedies or criminal
penalties to address the risk; whether risk creators are likely to be judg-
ment proof in the event that harm occurs; whether the risk is one to
which participants consent (as in surgery or in dangerous recreational ac-
tivities), or is in the nature of a nonconsensual externality; and whether
the risk could be addressed adequately through postmarket regulatory
mechanisms. 189
In this Article, I do not intend to explore these criteria in detail, but
I have provided numerous examples of successful operation of the Prin-
ciple in different regulatory contexts.'" As I argue below, Congress
should implement the Principle in chemical regulation-a field defined
by serious potential risks, uncertainty regarding health hazards and expo-
sure pathways, and deficient postmarket mechanisms for addressing the
risks.
189. Steve Shavell explored some of these same criteria nearly thirty years ago in his classic article
on the merits of liability rules versus public regulation as tools for risk management. See Shavell, su-
pra note 62.
190. See discussion supra Part IBI..
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III. IMPLEMENTING STRONG PRECAUTION IN CHEMICAL REGULATION
The current system of U.S. chemical regulation is deeply flawed. It
leaves Americans exposed to thousands of untested synthetic chemicals
that could cause cancer, problems in gene expression, birth defects, and
infertility. Although Congress intended the statute as an early warning
system for chemical risks, TSCA has failed to generate basic toxicity data
for the vast majority of chemicals now in commerce.191 As a result, chem-
icals used in consumer products, food packaging, clothing, toys, plastics,
and other products remain untested for their health effects. Moreover,
only a fraction of all air pollutants have ever been tested for toxic charac-
teristics.'" U.S. children consequently enter the world "prepolluted,"
having been dosed in utero with dozens of industrial chemicals (through
the mother's lifetime exposure) that have never been tested for their
health effects.93
In this Part, I discuss how the Strong Precautionary Principle could
contribute to a more effective chemical regulatory system in the United
States. I provide a brief summary of what has gone wrong in U.S. chemi-
cal regulation, supplementing a prior article where I discussed the flaws
of TSCA at some length.194 I then outline how the Strong Precautionary
Principle should be implemented in the next generation of U.S. chemical
regulation to remedy these problems. My goal here is to concretize the
debate over the Strong Precautionary Principle, which often dissolves in-
to airy abstraction, through showing how the Principle could advance
reform of an existing statute.
A. The Hollow Hope of TSCA
TSCA has never lived up to the ambitious expectations of its draft-
ers,95 who envisioned TSCA as a highly preventive "capstone" statute of
U.S. environmental law. 96
191. EPA's Integrated Risk Information System, the agency's compendium of data on the health
effects of chemicals, has full risk assessments for only 540 substances, and EPA reported in 2003 that
287 of these assessments may be out of date. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-743T,
Toxic CHEMICALS: EPA's NEW ASSESSMENT PROCESS WILL INCREASE CHALLENGES EPA FACES IN
EVALUATING AND REGULATING CHEMICALS 6 (2008). EPA has ordered testing under Section 4 of
TSCA for approximately 200 of 84,000 chemicals in the TSCA inventory. GAO, ENHANCING TSCA,
supra note 2, at 5.
192. Less than two hundred substances out of thousands of chemicals emitted to the ambient air
are regulated as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2006).
Moreover, the firms emitting these pollutants are not required to eliminate emissions, but only to in-
stall maximum achievable control technology. Id. § 7412(d)(2)
193. Kid-Safe Chemicals, ENVTL. WORKING GRP., http://www.ewg.org/kid-safe-chemicals-act-
blog/kid-safe-chemicals-act (last visited June 2, 2011). See also ENVTL. WORKING GRP., POLLUTION IN
PEOPLE: CORD BLOOD CONTAMINANTS IN MINORITY NEWBORNS (2009), http://www.ewg.org/files/
2009-Minority-Cord-Blood-Report.pdf; Woodruff et al., supra note 4.
194. Sachs, supra note 2, at 1825-33.
195. Some of the main players in the congressional debate viewed TSCA as a highly anticipatory
statute in which chemical manufacturers would bear the principal burdens of research, testing, and
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One fundamental problem with the statute is its sharply divergent
regulatory treatment of "new" chemicals and those that were already on
the market before 1979 (so-called "existing" chemicals). About seven
hundred new chemicals are manufactured each year, 197 and for these new
chemicals, manufacturers must submit a Premanufacture Notice (PMN)
to the EPA listing the structure and properties of the substance.198 EPA
has a ninety-day window to take any regulatory action,'" but significant-
ly, TSCA does not require that manufacturers submit toxicity data or
conduct any safety testing on new chemicals as part of the PMN
process.200
Consequently, while TSCA's new chemicals notice program bears a
superficial resemblance to an ex ante review process, it cannot be said to
reflect the Strong Precautionary Principle. Some scholars have referred
to TSCA's PMN procedure as an example of burden shifting in U.S. en-
vironmental law,2 01 but as John Applegate has explained, "[tihe PMN re-
quirement is less a licensing requirement than a sieve."202 Unlike U.S.
law governing pharmaceuticals and pesticides, TSCA imposes no affirm-
ative burden on the manufacturer to research the toxicity of new chemi-
cals, and manufacturers have no obligation to prove that a new chemical
poses acceptable, nonsignificant risks to human health.
Due to resource constraints and statutory hurdles to testing, the far-
larger class of more than 60,000 "existing" chemicals, introduced before
1979, has received little regulatory scrutiny.2 03 Congress grandfathered
disclosure. See Legislative History of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 94th Congress at 215 (state-
ment of Senator James Pearson) ("We can no longer operate under the assumption that what we do
not know about a chemical substance cannot hurt us. Tragic results associated with too many toxic
substances have taught us that lesson all too well. Chemicals, not people, must be put to the test.").
196. See James T. O'Reilly, Torture By TSCA: Retrospectives of a Failed Statute, NATURAL
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2010, at 43, 43. O'Reilly, currently a professor at the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, was a lobbyist for Procter & Gamble in the 1970s and participated in many
of the crucial negotiations that led to the passage of TSCA. Looking back on the legislative debate
over TSCA, he recently concluded that, "[t]his was a lobbying effort so effective, in retrospect, that
TSCA has been far less successful than its sponsors had hoped. My 'side' won in 1976. TSCA has
failed and left us with a mere fagade of effective environmental action." Id.
197. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-292T, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
OBSERVATIONS ON IMPROVING THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL Acr 2 (2009).
198. Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2010).
199. Id. See also Adelman, supra note 80, at 389 (calling the PMN review process "perfunctory"
and noting that the ninety-day window for EPA review is often "preclusive of regulatory action").
The EPA relies principally on computer modeling in its new chemical review process, and given re-
source constraints, only twenty percent of PMNs submitted receive a detailed review. GAO, OPTIONS
EXIST, supra note 2, at 11-12.
200. Manufacturers must disclose toxicity information about a new chemical only if such informa-
tion is in the manufacturer's "possession or control" or if it is "known to or reasonably ascertainable
by" the submitter. Premanufacture Notification, 40 CFR §§ 720.50(a)-(b) (2010). Under this "dis-
close it if you have it" model, it is not surprising that only fifteen percent of PMNs contain any health
and safety information. GAO, OPTIONS EXIST, supra note 2, at 11.
201. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 34, at 209-10; Wiener, supra note 35, at 1523.
202. Applegate, supra note 33, at 432.
203. Existing chemicals represent about seventy-eight percent of all chemicals that have been in-
troduced into commerce in the United States. Sachs, supra note 2, at 1826-27. But by volume, pre-
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these existing chemicals, and they are not subject to risk assessment re-
quirements except on an ad hoc basis through postmarket testing re-
quirements under Section 4 of TSCA. 21 EPA has exercised this post-
market testing authority for only two hundred chemicals.05 The
grandfathering of existing chemicals has no basis in toxicology, of course,
and the legislative choice to exempt existing chemicals from routine test-
ing now means that comprehensive toxicity data is available for just a
fraction of all chemicals used in the United States. 21 The main problem
that TSCA was meant to address-lack of data on chemicals-has not
been solved, thirty-five years after TSCA's enactment.207
Where scientific evidence does suggest that a chemical poses serious
risks to human health or the environment, TSCA raises significant bar-
riers for EPA to restrict the chemical-the opposite of precautionary risk
management. 20 I discussed the complex statutory procedures under
which EPA must prove "unreasonable risk" previously, in the context of
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of EPA's ban on asbestos. This government-
al burden of proof in chemical regulation has meant, in practice, that the
government has barely regulated at all, at least with respect to existing
chemicals already on the market. Moreover, while the Strong Pre-
cautionary Principle calls for proportional regulatory responses, TSCA
creates a one-size-fits-all system in which EPA must meet the same statu-
tory burden of proving "unreasonable risk" whether it wants to enact a
complete ban, simply restrict certain uses, or impose labeling require-
ments on a chemical. 209
TSCA is fundamentally unprotective-the "lapdog of American en-
vironmental law." 210  In 2009, the Government Accountability Office
named EPA's toxics regulatory program a "high risk" government pro-
gram, needing "broad-based transformation" and priority attention from
1976 existing chemicals still account for ninety-nine percent of the chemicals in commerce. Adelman,
supra note 80, at 389-90. So if the new chemicals program is viewed as a precautionary "pocket" in
the statute, as Wendy Wagner has suggested, it is a narrow pocket indeed. Wagner, supra note 87, at
285-86. While TSCA authorizes testing of existing chemicals, "it generally provides no specific re-
quirement, time frame, or methodology for doing so.... As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the
risks of the more than 83,000 commercial chemicals in use." GAO, supra note 197, at 4.
204. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006).
205. GAO, supra note 198, at 5.
206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207. These statutory flaws have been exacerbated by insufficient funding for TSCA. Historically,
the number of agency personnel devoted to TSCA implementation has been less than the number de-
voted to implementation of FIFRA, the statute governing pesticides, despite the fact that pesticides
represent a far smaller universe of chemicals. See Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a
Program That Can Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034 (2009).
208. For example, EPA can enact restrictions on a chemical only after a full trial-type hearing; it
must make a series of statutory findings prior to restrictions, it must choose the "least burdensome"
regulatory requirement that will adequately protect against the risk, and it must demonstrate that no
other statute could address the concern. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a), (c).
209. See Denison, supra note 4, at 10022 (discussing TSCA's uniform "unreasonable risk" stand-
ard and comparing it to the goal of proportionality of regulatory response in the Precautionary Prin-
ciple).
210. Sachs, supra note 2, at 1818.
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the Obama administration and Congress. 211 EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson testified in 2009 that TSCA is "outdated and does not provide
the tools to adequately protect human health and the environment as the
American people expect, demand and deserve. "212
At the same time that the weaknesses of TSCA have become ap-
parent, it has also become clear that the tort system does not provide an
adequate backstop or substitute for regulatory oversight. In a recent
book comparing European and U.S. risk regulation, Donald Elliott and
Ortwinn Renn suggest that despite clear flaws in TSCA, the overall sys-
tem of chemical regulation in the United States remains protective of
human health and is roughly as precautionary as Europe's. 213 "The po-
tent civil liability system in the United States," they allege, "is at least as
important a regulatory system for chemicals as is EPA regulation under
TSCA."214 This conclusion, however, runs contrary to decades of schol-
arship highlighting the inadequacies of the tort system for addressing
chemical exposures, given long latency periods and difficulties of proving
causation and identifying the proper defendant. 215 The threat of future
liability does not provide an incentive for chemical manufacturers to
conduct toxicity research. More likely, the tort system provides incen-
tives for manufacturers not to conduct toxicity research, given that such
research would be subject to discovery and that the plaintiff will bear the
burden of proof in any civil suit.216
Given the weaknesses of existing regulatory and tort remedies for
harms from toxic chemicals, Congress should overhaul TSCA through
establishing a substantial ex ante licensing and review system for chemi-
cal risks. There is a fundamental difference between chemical risks and
other kinds of risks, such as those from recreational activities, power
tools, and other activities described above, which can be handled reason-
ably well through informed consent, mutual bargaining, or tort-based de-
terrence regimes. 217 In the case of chemical exposures, a person harmed
is usually unaware of the exposure, the level of risk posed by the expo-
sure, or the entity that produced the harmful product. Concepts of in-
formed consent, assumption of risk, or Coasian bargaining are inapplica-
211. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-271, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 22-24
(2009) ("Without greater attention to EPA's efforts to assess toxic chemicals, the nation lacks assur-
ance that human health and the enviromnent are adequately protected.").
212. Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works (Dec. 2, 2009).
213. Ortwinn Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING
RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011).
214. Id. at 229.
215. See supra note 62. See also John T. Nockleby, Faces of the Tort Pyramid: Compensation,
Regulation, and the Profession, in AN UNFINISHED PROJECr: LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
(Scott Cummings ed., 2010) (arguing that the regulatory function of tort law is severely compromised
by the vagaries of litigation, such as the desire of plaintiff's lawyers to seek out only those "ideal"
plaintiffs with easy-to-prove injuries, high damages, and claims against financially solvent defendants).
216. See Wagner, supra note 87, at 469.
217. See supra Part II.C.
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ble in this context. Regulation, rather than litigation or decentralized
risk allocation through contract, must be the primary legal mechanism
for addressing chemical risks.
B. Toward the Next Generation of Chemical Regulation
A twenty-first century chemical regulatory regime must have a clear
mission, set priorities, and provide EPA with tools to carry out the mis-
sion. It must be based on the best scientific information, but should not
preclude action where there is residual or unresolvable scientific uncer-
tainty. Below, I sketch the elements of a Strong Precautionary approach
to chemical regulation-one that puts the primary burden of risk re-
search and risk justification on chemical manufacturers, while avoiding
the parade of horribles predicted by critics of Strong Precaution.
1. Precautionary Research Requirements
A Strong Precautionary approach to chemical regulation must in-
clude default chemical testing requirements. Indeed, it is hard to see
how any chemical regulatory regime could be deemed protective of hu-
man health or the environment without an initial, default requirement to
compile risk assessment data for most chemicals on the market.
Congress should eliminate the elaborate statutory hurdles in TSCA
that restrict EPA's ability to obtain information. Instead, Congress
should mandate that chemical manufacturers and importers develop a
basic set of toxicity data for each chemical they produce or import above
some de minimis tonnage threshold, implementing the principle of "No
Data, No Market" in the United States. There should be no distinctions
in the required tests for "existing" and "new" chemicals, but the mini-
mum data set could be expanded for the highest-volume chemicals sold
in the United States, such as benzene and formaldehyde. Congress could
also mandate that manufacturers' testing proceed according to a "priori-
ty list" of chemicals suspected of posing the greatest risks, an idea at the
heart of the TSCA reform bill introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg
in April 2010.218 Imposing the burden of data production on chemical
manufacturers would make the profit motive the engine of toxicology re-
218. Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(1) (2010).
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search in the United States, 219 as any chemical for which manufacturers
fail to submit the required data would be prohibited from sale.220
Critics of Strong Precaution often contend that the Principle is anti-
innovation, but they have not elaborated why a requirement that manu-
facturers research the risks from their own products is suspect, or why
such a requirement would interfere with innovation within a firm. In
chemical regulation, default testing requirements could actually help to
spur product innovation. More abundant information on chemical risks
would inform the marketplace, allowing both manufacturers and retailers
to compete on product safety as well as product characteristics.2 2 1
Critics of Strong Precaution also contend that the Principle locks in
a "status quo bias." 222 They contend that by adopting a stance of skepti-
cism for new products or technologies, the Principle ignores the risks
posed by existing products and technologies. 223 In chemical regulation,
however, it is current law that locks in status quo bias, by grandfathering
all "existing" chemicals that were on the market before 1979. To end this
unjustifiable distinction, Congress could make the same risk assessment
procedures, required on an ex ante premarket basis for new chemicals,
applicable to existing chemicals as well. It could do this by providing for
a phase-in period of three to five years, which would allow manufacturers
to gather data on chemicals already on the market.224 There is nothing in
the language of the Strong Precautionary Principle that restricts it solely
to "new" products or to pioneering technologies. By phasing its review
processes for those products and technologies already on the market, the
Principle can be adapted to avoid status quo bias.
In chemical regulation, fortunately, the financial barriers to obtain-
ing risk assessment data for existing chemicals have been lowered con-
siderably because most major U.S. chemical manufacturers are already
conducting the necessary testing of existing chemicals to comply with the
219. Placing the burden of data production on industry would represent a return to the original
vision of TSCA, whose preamble states that development of toxicity data "should be the responsibility
of those who manufacture and those who process . . . chemical substances and mixtures." TSCA, 15
U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2006). The substantive provisions of TSCA, however, place the burden on EPA to
prove that testing should be conducted for chemicals already on the market. See id. § 2603. Wendy
Wagner notes that this is just one example of TSCA's "schizophrenic regulatory approach." Wagner,
supra note 87, at 464 n.6. See also WILLIAM H. ROGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 489 (2d ed. 1994)
("TSCA is teeming with contradictions.. .. ").
220. To avoid duplicative testing, a new statute should contain provisions for joint research and
data sharing, similar to provisions in REACH establishing Substance Information Exchange Fora in
the registration process. See REACH, supra note 75, at 104; see also REACH Consortia,
CHEMICALWATCH, http://chemicalwatch.com/REACH-consortia (last visited June 2, 2011) (listing
joint research consortia that have been established for over one hundred substances).
221. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 1840.
222. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 42-45.
223. Id.
224. In pharmaceutical regulation, Congress enacted a similar phase-in requirement for drugs
already on the market when it amended the FFDCA in 1962 to require that manufacturers prove effi-
cacy as well as safety. See Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO L. J. 185, 195-
96 (1972) (describing transitional provisions for drugs already on the market).
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EU's REACH regulation.225 Cost estimates for REACH indicate that
the cost of comprehensive toxicity testing for all chemicals on the EU
market sold in volumes above ten tons is between C3 billion and E13 bil-
lion over eleven years, a reasonable cost burden for the global chemical
industry, which has annual revenues approaching $1 trillion. 226
The cost estimates for REACH implementation are a significant
contribution to the debate over the Strong Precautionary Principle. One
of the major criticisms of establishing a licensing system for chemicals, in
which manufacturers bear the burden of proof on safety, is that it will
impose exorbitant costs on private industry and require an expansion of
government risk assessment personnel to review the new data.227  But
REACH shows that the necessary investments in toxicity testing are not
excessively costly given the potential risks and given industry revenues.
Private sector research costs in this context should be seen as a fully ap-
propriate internalization of an externality.228 Moreover, the cost of over-
hauling chemical regulation in the United States is likely to be less ex-
pensive than in Europe. The United States has a second-mover
advantage here, since much of the testing likely to be required of U.S.
chemical firms is already being conducted, by these same firms, for
REACH compliance.
2. Shifting the Burden of Proof
The second major element of a Strong Precautionary approach to
chemical regulation is a shift in the burden of proof. If initial required
testing demonstrates a serious threat to human health or the environ-
ment (as defined below), there should be statutory presumption that the
chemical will be banned from sale (or its use restricted). The burden
would then shift to the manufacturer to show why that chemical should
continue to be marketed in the United States, despite the threat.
Under this regulatory structure, persistent scientific uncertainty
about the nature or extent of the risk will be resolved against the chemi-
cal, in contrast to current law, in which scientific uncertainty undercuts
EPA's ability to enact precautionary restrictions. Moreover, industry
will have a financial incentive to resolve scientific uncertainties and to
225. See Sachs, supra note 2, at 1857 (discussing the informational spillover effects of REACH).
226. See id. at 1842-43 (discussing REACH cost estimates).
227. See Valerie J. Brown, REACHing for Chemical Safety, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., at A766,
A768 (2003) (noting that the critics of REACH argue that "the combination of the increased financial
burden of testing, the bureaucracy of registration and authorization, and the requirement of applying
the precautionary principle will discourage innovation and could ruin many small and medium-sized
enterprises").
228. See FRANK ACKERMAN & RACHEL MASSEY, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV'T INST., THE TRUE
COSTS OF REACH 10-11 (2004) (arguing that if a chemical essential to downstream users is with-
drawn from the market because its manufacturer believes it is not worth paying testing costs, then the
chemical is probably underpriced).
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identify means of reducing risks from chemicals with known hazardous
properties, to overcome the default regulatory presumption.
To structure this burden shift, Congress should implement both
priority-setting mechanisms (which I call "precautionary triggers") and
avenues for manufacturers to overcome default prohibitions by demon-
strating acceptable risk (which I call "regulatory offramps"). Both are
explained in more detail below.
a. Precautionary Triggers
The task of risk assessment and risk management will quickly be-
come unwieldy if burden shifting is applied to tens of thousands of chem-
icals simultaneously. If government is to serve as a risk gatekeeper, there
must be priority-setting mechanisms, as a matter of practical necessity, to
limit the number of products being reviewed at one time. To set priori-
ties and reduce costs, Congress should rely on precautionary triggers for
burden shifting, under which the burden of proof would shift to chemical
manufacturers only for the subset of high-priority chemicals that meet
the trigger, not for the entire universe of chemicals on the market. Fo-
cusing on subsets of hazardous chemicals is fully consistent with the
Strong Precautionary Principle because, as I argued in Part I, the Prin-
ciple calls for burden shifting for serious threats to human health and the
environment, not for every possible risk.229
One such precautionary trigger could be the intrinsic hazards of a
chemical, as determined through animal testing, in vitro analysis, ecologi-
cal fate and transport studies, or computer modeling. Here, the relevant
regulatory question is whether the chemical is capable of causing cancer,
reproductive harm, or other adverse health or ecosystem effects. The
advantage of relying on intrinsic hazard as the threshold inquiry, rather
than the actual risk of harm to humans,2 30 is that hazards can be identified
relatively easily through laboratory experiments and an understanding of
the physical and chemical properties of the substance. Detailed human
exposure assessment is not necessary.
Under REACH, chemical hazards that trigger burden shifting in the
authorization process include carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, reproductive
toxicity, persistence in the environment and the ability of a chemical to
accumulate in the food chain. 1 The European Commission predicts that
229. See supra Part I.
230. Risk is generally characterized as a combination of a chemical's intrinsic hazard and the de-
gree of human exposure. See APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 18. Under the precautionary trig-
ger proposed here, intrinsic hazard alone would trigger burden shifting. Exposure issues, including
whether safety precautions such as ventilation or protective equipment could reduce human expo-
sures, could then be raised by manufacturers as an argument for why the chemical should not be with-
drawn. The overall regulatory architecture would therefore remain risk based, not solely hazard
based.
231. REACH, supra note 75, at 142. See also APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 13, at 23
("[Slubstances of very high concern should, in accordance with the precautionary principle, be subject
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approximately 1500 chemicals, or five percent of the 30,000 chemicals
expected to be registered under the law, will fall into this "very high con-
cern" category.232 A Strong Precautionary regime needs some mechan-
ism for delineating the class of chemicals that will be deemed to pose
"serious" threats, and intrinsic hazard is a logical, feasible starting point
for that line drawing. TSCA, on the other hand, provides no mechanism
for deciding which characteristics of chemicals should trigger further in-
quiry or a regulatory response other than the vague framework of "un-
reasonable risk."
A second potential trigger for burden shifting could be the results of
biomonitoring studies. Biomonitoring is the study of the presence of in-
dustrial chemicals in humans. In several studies in the past decade, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has demonstrated that do-
zens of industrial chemicals are commonly found in the blood and urine
of representative samples of the U.S. population.233 The Environmental
Working Group, in its own testing, found that of 210 synthetic chemicals
tested in a population of nine volunteers, 167 chemicals were found in at
least one person, and some chemicals, such as brominated flame retar-
dants, were present in nearly all the volunteers.23 Most prior biomoni-
toring studies have had limited sample sizes,235 but if they were signifi-
cantly expanded, the data could be used to compile a list of synthetic
chemicals commonly found in Americans. These chemicals could then
be presumed unsafe -the precautionary trigger. The burden of proof for
continued marketing of this class of chemicals would then switch to man-
ufacturers, on the grounds that manufacturers should have an affirmative
obligation to demonstrate that chemicals widely dispersed inside our
bodies are not causing any substantial harm to human health.
The American Chemistry Council challenges the regulatory utility
of biomonitoring data, claiming that it "provide[s] a snapshot of the U.S.
population's exposure to certain substances in our environment," and
that "the detection of a substance does not by itself indicate a safety con-
cern." 236 To be sure, the presence of an industrial chemical in human tis-
sues does not by itself indicate harm, but given the widespread uptake of
to careful attention."). Similarly, the Maine Toxic Chemicals in Children's Products Act classifies
chemicals of "high concern" as those that can cause cancer or reproductive or developmental harm;
those that disrupt the endocrine system; and those that are persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1693 (2010).
232. Q and A on the New Chemicals Policy, REACH, EUROPA (Dec. 13, 2006), http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/488.
233. See generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., supra note 4 (discussing the use of
biomonitoring to track the U.S. population's exposure to environmental chemicals).
234. See JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING GRP., BODYBURDEN: THE POLLUTION IN
PEOPLE 3, 38-39 (2003).
235. See Denison, supra note 4, at 10025 ("Government has yet to conduct broader, more explor-
atory biomonitoring-aimed at identifying the full range of xenobiotics to which humans are exposed,
as one means of identifying chemicals that are priorities for further scrutiny. . . .").
236. Biomonitoring, AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, http://www.americanchemistry.com/biomon
itoring (last visited June 2, 2011).
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certain chemicals by humans, that presence should at least trigger a shift
in the burden in proof-an affirmative requirement to prove the lack of
substantial harm.37
b. Regulatory Offramps
Strong Precaution does not require banning all risky products or ac-
tivities, nor does it require banning all chemicals with intrinsically haz-
ardous characteristics. Many hazardous compounds offer important
benefits for the economy and human welfare. For example, mercury, a
potent neurotoxin, is used to make compact fluorescent light bulbs and
flat-panel computer monitors. Properly construed, the Strong Pre-
cautionary Principle should provide an opportunity for a chemical manu-
facturer to justify why marketing of a chemical should be permitted,
overcoming any default presumption against sale. In a successor statute
to TSCA, manufacturers should be provided an opportunity to show
that a chemical with hazardous characteristics should still be permitted to
be marketed because: (1) the actual risks to human health or the envi-
ronment are not substantial, (2) the risks can be controlled through limit-
ing exposure, or (3) the benefits of the chemical to society outweigh any
risk.
Through these provisions, the overall regulatory structure would
remain focused on the actual risks of a chemical to human health and the
environment, not just on the intrinsic properties of the chemical. A
manufacturer could demonstrate, for example, that a substance, although
hazardous in laboratory tests on rodents, actually poses no substantial
risk to humans or ecosystems because of the way it is used commercially
(e.g., that it is sealed in polymers; that there is limited potential for inha-
lation, digestion, or dermal exposures; or that environmental releases can
be prevented through proper disposal in a licensed facility). These provi-
sions, moreover, would allow some weighing of the risks of a chemical
against its benefits, within an overarching regulatory system grounded in
Strong Precaution. In contrast to current law, however, the manufactur-
er, rather than the government, would conduct the cost-benefit analysis
and bear the burden of proof.
I refer to these mechanisms as "regulatory offramps." They help to
counter the charge of many critics that Strong Precaution is a straight-
jacketing approach that offers no regulatory flexibility. They also alle-
237. One of the TSCA reform bills from the last Congress, the Safe Chemicals Act, relied heavily
on precautionary burden shifting. Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010). It re-
quired EPA, within eighteen months after enactment, to establish a rotating "priority list" of 300 sub-
stances. Id. For any substance on that list, the burden would switch to the manufacturer to prove a
"reasonable certainty of no harm." Id. §§ 4, 7. The bill stated that chemical substances should be add-
ed to list "at the Administrator's discretion, based on available scientific evidence, and consideration
of their risk relative to other chemical substances, based upon presence in biological and environmen-
tal media, use, production volume, toxicity, persistence, bioaccumulation, or other properties indicat-
ing risk." Id. § 7.
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viate concerns about risk-risk tradeoffs, because if significant economic
damage or welfare loss will result from restrictions on a chemical, the
manufacturer will have the opportunity to make the case that restrictions
are unwarranted.
As noted in Part II, the EU has pioneered use of regulatory of-
framps in REACH.23 Under REACH, regulators may grant a time-
limited authorization to continue to market a "very high concern" chem-
ical if the manufacturer or importer can demonstrate that the risks to
human health and the environment are "adequately controlled," or if this
showing cannot be made, 239 the manufacturer or importer must demon-
strate: (1) that the socio-economic benefits exceed the risks, and (2) that
are no suitable substitute chemicals or technologies. 24 0
Regulatory offramps should be a component of chemical regulation
in the United States, but in implementing offramps, regulators should not
take at face value manufacturers' arguments that known hazardous
chemicals actually present little risk because exposures are minimal or
because risks can be controlled through warnings. Historically, the Unit-
ed States has done a poor job of tracking uses and exposures to chemi-
cals once chemicals are put on the market. Because many of the most
hazardous classes of chemicals also persist in the environment for dec-
ades, it can be difficult to predict the degree of human exposure over
time.24 1
Substitution analysis should also be a required component of the
regulatory offramp process. If a chemical manufacturer seeks to market
a chemical with known hazardous properties or that is already widely
present in the bodies of Americans, it should also have an obligation to
investigate whether any less hazardous substitute chemicals are available
that could serve the same purpose. An improved chemical regulatory re-
gime should not only require scientifically sound analysis of the risks of a
particular chemical, but also incentivize reductions in the use of all haz-
ardous chemicals over time.
238. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
239. REACH presumes that risks cannot be adequately controlled for persistent and bioaccumul-
ative chemicals and for chemicals that do not have a known safe threshold below which a lack of ad-
verse effects can be documented. REACH, supra note 75, at 153.
240. Id. at 150.
241. See TSCA and Persistent, Bioaccumulative, and Toxic Chemicals: Examining Domestic and
International Actions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot., U.S.
Cong. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of Linda E. Greer, Direc-
tor, Health and Environment Program, Natural Resources Defense Council) ("Because risk assess-
ments require a quantification of exposure levels, and because the levels of [Persistent, Bioaccumula-
tive, and Toxic compounds] will continue to rise for as long as the contaminant is released into the
environment or the food chain, [regulators] cannot adequately evaluate the harm posed by this class of
compounds.").
1337
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The Strong Precautionary Principle provides a useful framework for
managing risk in the face of scientific uncertainty. Widely derided as in-
flexible, unworkable, counterproductive, or anti-innovation, the Principle
has been consistently attacked in the academic literature on risk regula-
tion. Yet, as this Article has shown, the Principle already animates many
successful risk regulatory regimes in the United States. It is not blind to
risk-risk tradeoffs, nor must it ignore the cost of regulation. The Prin-
ciple does reflect, however, the intuition that those who introduce poten-
tially risky products to the marketplace should bear the burden of re-
searching and justifying the risks. The Principle is particularly useful in
areas such as chemical regulation, where there is a potential for serious
harm, where there is scientific uncertainty about the nature of risk, and
where less aggressive, decentralized mechanisms are clearly inadequate
to address the risk.
Chemical regulation provides a helpful case study of the Principle's
utility in risk management. Widely viewed as a "broken statute," 24 2 the
current TSCA regime needs more than incremental reform. Shifting the
burden of proof would dramatically alter the perverse incentives of the
existing statute and would end the data drought that has plagued chemi-
cal regulation since the 1970s. A fundamental rethinking of chemical
regulation is urgently needed, and the Strong Precautionary Principle
provides a sound theoretical basis for protecting public health and re-
forming TSCA's unprotective, unprecautionary approach.
242. Greenwood, supra note 207, at 10034.
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